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sources. This requires the serious commitment of actors across the 
entire society and the rapid implementation of ambitious 
technology and behaviour-oriented policies. 
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Preface 
The German “Energiewende” (energy transition) is meant to be a contract between 
generations. The rebuilding of the whole energy system is designed and financed today 
in order to safeguard our children and grandchildren against fundamental risks: the 
enormous economic, social and environmental costs of a fossil-nuclear energy system, 
the risks of the nuclear fuel-cycle and the impacts of climate change, as well as energy 
import dependency, price shocks and geopolitical disputes over scarce resources. In 
contrast, a successful Energiewende creates new business areas and qualified jobs and 
increases competitiveness in the ‘green race’ – in particular on the lead markets for 
efficiency technology and renewable energy.  
Accordingly, the Energiewende is described in this book as the collective effort of post-
war German history and as a unique learning arena for a positive socio-economic 
transformation with international relevance. As such it should be understood to be a 
dynamic formation process rather than the implementation of a grand master plan.  
The Energiewende is more than the mere substitution of fossil and nuclear energy 
carriers with renewable energy and energy efficiency. It is a socio-economic 
transformation, an arena for experimenting with the transformation of a highly 
industrialized country in a globalized world. Hence, the effects of the Energiewende in 
Germany are of great importance for the interplay with European neighbouring 
countries as well as other industrialized and emerging economies. A successful 
transition has the potential to catalyze sustainable energy use, climate change mitigation 
and environmental protection around the world. However, it should not be forgotten 
that there are often crucial enabling conditions under which such a transformation can 
take place. The Energiewende would not exist in today’s form without its roots in the 
strong social movements against nuclear power in the 1970s and 80s, which triggered 
a search process for alternative energy paths. 
The unprecedented Energiewende can only succeed as a collective effort. This effort is 
based on the public perception of a long-term, foresighted transition process, which in 
turn requires an active and ambitious state. So far the Energiewende has benefited 
strongly from the considerable engagement of actors at all levels, from individual 
citizens to municipalities, companies, and regions. National policies have produced 
some impulses, but there still is a clear lack of long-term planning and concerted 
political effort. Technological and social innovation as well as accelerated market 
transformation demand vivid entrepreneurship across all levels of society – including 
our political systems. And let’s not forget that the active participation of citizens – 
resulting from the democratization and decentralization of the energy system – is by no 
means a nice-to-have side-effect, but the key pillar on which the Energiewende and its 
public acceptance rest.  
10 
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1. Energiewende – From social 
movement to political and scientific 
consensus? 
 The Energiewende has its roots in the anti-nuclear social movement of the 70s 
and 80s. 
 Today there is broad social consensus about the need for the Energiewende as 
well as broad scientific consensus about its technical feasibility in Germany. 
 The official target system of the Energiewende implies ambitious reductions of 
both energy consumption and CO2 emissions. 
Until now, any form of industrialization has been heavily based on finite energy 
resources – first coal, later oil and natural gas. The finite character of fossil fuels, 
pollution caused by extraction and combustion and, finally, man-made climate change 
emerged as inherent problems of an energy economy based on coal, oil and natural gas.  
There was, for a short historic period only, the illusion that civil use of nuclear energy 
provides an inexhaustible, cheap energy source. The price society had to pay for this 
illusion were two catastrophic accidents (Chernobyl and Fukushima), a radiating 
heritage that lasts thousands of years, massive social distortions and, not least, massive 
barriers to innovation and investments in alternatives. And still, new nuclear power 
plants cannot compete economically with low-cost alternatives – above all energy 
efficiency – on the market for energy services. 
Coal, oil, natural gas, and also nuclear energy ruled the post-war energy economy by 
offering (mostly subsidized) cheap energy, by shifting all external costs to the future 
and by benefiting from a seemingly unlimited abundance of energy resources. While 
the specific energy bases of the two parts of Germany each developed differently, there 
was unity in the misjudgement of how to secure energy supplies and minimize risks. It 
was clear that the era of fossil fuels will come to an end and that replacement is needed. 
Due to the sheer scale of the damage that a nuclear melt-down would cause, nuclear 
was in fact a rather poor replacement for fossil fuels. However, the “residual risk” 
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attached to nuclear energy was presented as so small that it appeared as a reasonable 
burden for the economy and society. 
1.1. The roots of the transition – Social movements in 
the 70s 
Spotlight December 1975. Tens of thousands protest in West Germany against the 
construction of a new nuclear reactor in the village of Whyl at the French border. The 
causes behind the vast expansion plans for nuclear power can be found in an economic 
crisis (a doubling of unemployment) and the impact of the oil crisis a couple of years 
earlier. Oil crises began with the coup in Iran and the Suez Crisis in the 50s. After the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the rise of monetary policy, the Yom-Kippur 
War triggered the first oil price shock in 1973. OPEC reduced oil supplies by 5% to 
put pressure on the supporters of Israel. In just a few days the oil price increased by 
70% and this had a strong impact on economies around the world. The oil embargo 
highlighted the economic dependence on cheap fossil energy and in particular fossil 
motor fuels. 
The German government under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt responded in the mid-
1970s by supporting the development of coal liquefaction technology and increasing 
power generation capacities. An exceptional law allowed power companies at that time 
to build power plants and get the costs reimbursed without carrying any risks. This 
policy to increase supply seemed to be justified by the “iron law” of a doubling demand 
every ten years, i.e. the constant annual growth of power consumption by 7% in the 
post-war era.  
If implemented, this exorbitant build-up of nuclear power plants (50GW additional 
capacity were envisioned) would have led to a situation comparable to the status quo 
in France, where nuclear power has a share of more than 70% (“SPD/KERNKRAFT 
Großer Irrtum,” 1977). The resistance against this prospect was strong and just in time. 
It came both from risk-averse citizens and from within the power sector, which had a 
more realistic assessment of due efficiency improvements and the slowdown of demand. 
The conflicts around the construction of the nuclear power plant (NPP) ‘Brokdorf’ 
further catalyzed the growing resistance against nuclear energy. The federal association 
of environmental citizens’ initiatives coordinated major demonstrations. However, 
demands for a nuclear phase-out only became capable of winning a majority after the 
nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island (Harrisburg) had occurred in 1979. Further 
key protests by the anti-nuclear movement took place in Kalkar (1977-1985), where a 
fast breeder was under construction, and later in Wackersdorf (1981-89), where a 
reprocessing plant for nuclear fuel was planned. Neither of the two facilities ever went 
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into operation. The power plant in Kalkar was sold to an investor who turned it into 
an amusement park; the “Kernwasser Wunderland” (nuclear water wonderland) was 
opened in 1996. 
Since 1985, when the final decision was made not to take the fast breeder in Kalkar 
into operation, nuclear power generation in Germany has been in retreat. In 1986 the 
Social Democrats (SPD) decided after the Chernobyl catastrophe to enact a nuclear 
phase-out (once in power). It still took until the year 2000, when the red-green 
government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer finally managed to reach an 
agreement between all stakeholders. The nuclear phase-out – stretched over 20 years – 
became law.  
But the fight against nuclear energy was not over. The postponement of the nuclear 
phase-out shortly before the Fukushima catastrophe and the re-enactment of the phase-
out shortly after the accident created a hole in legislation which may result in billions 
of compensation payments to NPP operators. German policymakers did not have the 
courage to push through legally viable alternative phase-out pathways, e.g. an ordinance 
that the consequences of an accident have to be limited to the site of the NPP, the 
cancellation of privileges such as limited liability or tax clearance of capital reserves, or 
the closure of NPPs due to the lack of evidence that waste has been safely disposed of.  
The protest movement of recent years goes against the watering-down of the agreed 
nuclear phase-out and turns increasingly towards a positive transition as represented by 
the Energiewende. No topic has ever seen such stable opposition as the public 
opposition against nuclear energy – despite the attempts of the financially powerful 
proponent to turn public opinion around. That nuclear power is still a hot political 
topic in Germany could be seen after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, when the 
largest demonstration against NPPs in German history took place. 
While the anti-nuclear movement was absolutely crucial for the formation of German 
environmentalism, there are several other social discourses that developed in parallel 
and that are also important for understanding the origins of the Energiewende. The 
anti-nuclear movement in West Germany benefited from close ties to the peace 
movement, which was targeted against the positioning of nuclear missiles in Germany. 
Civil and military uses of nuclear fission were rightly seen by the social movements as 
being interconnected. Another hot environmental topic of the 1980s was the 
Waldsterben (forest dieback), which was related to acid rain caused by power plant 
emissions.  Further issues that entered the public discourse of the energy system include 
(cf. Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006): resistance against open-cast mining for lignite (and the 
required resettlements), the dependency on natural gas imports from Russia, the Iraq 
wars (which were often framed as wars for oil), suspicion against large energy 
corporations and, more recently, also positive aspects such as job creation and export 
opportunities in the renewable energy sector.  
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1.2. A change of perspective from “Eco-dictatorship” 
(1980) to broad consensus (2010) 
In the historic analysis of the nuclear phase-out, the interplay between scientific analyses 
and the anti-nuclear movement has to be unravelled. However, it is a fact that as far 
back as 1980 a phase-out scenario was presented to the government committee inquiry 
“Future Nuclear Energy Policy”. In spite of closely reflecting actual developments, this 
scenario was criticized heavily and was only supported by a very small minority. The 
scenario up until 2030 even anticipated the main elements of what has become today’s 
scientific phase-out consensus. Has science since then been driven by social movements 
and how have real developments been affected? 
In 1975 Amory Lovins coined the expression “Soft Energy Path”, which showed the 
way from centralized fossil and nuclear energy towards an energy efficiency revolution 
and renewable energy. One year later his book entitled “Soft Energy Path. Toward a 
Durable Peace” was published (Lovins, 1979). One central message in this concept 
study was to focus on energy services such as heating, light or mobility, rather than 
energy carriers. Energy services are the useful effect resulting from energy-efficient 
technology and energy-saving measures.  
In Germany the Öko-Institut published the study “Energy transition. Growth and 
welfare without oil and uranium” (1980), which illustrated an alternative energy future 
following Lovins’ scenarios in his soft energy path. This study became the basis for the 
so-called “Path 4” of the government committee inquiry “Future Nuclear Energy 
Policy”. While “Path 1” – the favourite of the energy sector – implied an exorbitant 
increase in nuclear power (50% of which would be provided by breeders) and a 
necessary increase of primary energy supply to 560Mtoe until 2030, “Path 4” described 
nuclear phase-out and a reduction of primary energy supply to 220Mtoe.  
At that time this was a novelty for the established energy science community and a 
provocation for the energy sector, which shared the mainstream view that energy 
consumption is coupled to economic growth. Accordingly, the government committee 
classified Path 4 as “extreme”, its technological feasibility as “very debatable” and the 
costs as “incalculable”. Some even saw in Path 4 a direction that would lead to an 
authoritarian eco-dictatorship. 
In contrast, as far back as the 1980s, the Öko-Institut showed in scenarios and analyses 
of technological potential how economic development is feasible without increasing 
consumption of coal, oil, gas and uranium. Savings and efficiency were regarded as key 
for the decrease in energy demand. The focus was not only on renewable energy, but 
combined heat and power (CHP), district heating and efficiency technologies also 
played important roles. 
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A second consecutive study by the Öko-Institut called “Die Energiewende ist möglich“ 
(Hennicke, Johnson, Kohler, & Seifried, 1985) went beyond technological feasibility 
and demonstrated both the socio-political and economic feasibility of the 
transformation to a mainly decentral energy economy with municipalities as key actors 
(“re-municipalization”).  
These concepts and scenarios were taken up and further developed throughout the 
1980s and 90s. Climate change mitigation appeared more and more on the scientific 
and political radar. First suggestions were made (by opposition parties) to strive for 
significant GHG emission reductions and nuclear phase-out at the same time. The plan 
was to achieve this mainly by a massive increase in energy productivity. This was, 
however, far from being the mainstream among energy experts. Phase-out of nuclear 
and fossil fuel use in Germany until 2050? For the majority of energy economy studies, 
this was still unthinkable in the 1990s.  
It is encouraging and at the same time exciting that the vast majority of energy experts 
in Germany now consider an “energy transition path” to be technologically feasible. 
This is not the case in many comparable countries. It is certainly not going too far to 
claim: without the long scientific controversy around the feasibility of a soft energy 
path for Germany and the slow convergence towards scientific consensus, the 
“conservative revolution” of 2010/11 would not have taken place. 
1.3. The “Conservative Revolution” 
When the conservative government of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Liberals (FDP) 
came to power in 2009, its explicit goal was to decide against the massive opposition of 
civil society and a large share of energy experts and prolong the operation of NPPs. 
While there was consensus not to build any new NPPs, there was the attraction to 
prolong “cheap” nuclear power generation in depreciated NPPs. Some people just 
could not imagine that a significant transition of the energy system could take place 
before 2050. 
This temporary extension of the operational life of NPPs is very important for the 
German energy transition as it was accompanied by much more comprehensive and 
progressive long-term targets for the energy system. These targets gained even more 
significance after the lifetime extension had been taken back as a reaction to the 
Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. 
In 2010 Merkel’s conservative government agreed on the future energy concept, which 
sets “revolutionary targets” (chancellor Merkel) for the reduction of GHG emissions, 
renewable energy and energy saving (Federal Government of Germany, 2010). No 
government in the world has so far had the courage to publish such ambitious targets. 
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They present a roadmap for energy policy until 2050 (see Table 1). The energy concept 
is a first important step in the German Energiewende. It shows that the target system 
does not only have a long-term time horizon, but that it is also more ambitious than 
the lead targets of the EU (20-20-20).  
Table 1:  
Target system of the German Energiewende 
 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 
GHG emissions (base year 1990) 
GHG emissions  -22.6 % -40 % -55 % -70 % -80 to 95 % 
Renewable energy 
Share in gross final 
consumption 
12 % 18 % 30 % 45 % 60 % 
Share in gross electricity 
consumption 
25.3 % 35 % 50 % 65 % 80 % 
Share in heat consumption 9.1 % 14 %    
Share in transportation 5.5 %     
Energy efficiency and saving (base year 2008)                                                                   * (base year 2005) 
Primary energy consumption -3.8 % -20 %   -50 % 
Energy productivity (final 
consumption) per year 
0.2 %  
(2008-13) 
   2.1 %  
(2008-50) 
Gross electricity 
consumption 
-3.2 % -10 %   -25 % 
Primary energy supply -5.5 %    ca. -80 % 
Heat supply 0.8 % -20 %    
Final energy consumption in 
transportation*  
1 % -10 %   -40 % 
 
What moves a conservative government to publish such progressive targets, where there 
is a realistic “risk” that business and civil society will take them seriously? One 
explanation might be that it was a political deal to gain public acceptance for the heavily 
criticized extension of nuclear power generation. Revolutionary long-term targets may 
have been used to cover up the departure from the social-democrat nuclear phase-out 
roadmap. 
The extension for NPPs implied that the last reactor would not be taken from the grid 
until 2036. It was a very controversial issue among experts whether cheap electricity 
from NPPs would constitute too large a barrier to investment and innovation to allow 
for dynamic growth of energy efficiency and renewable energy. There was, however, 
consensus in the modelling community that the “revolutionary” targets laid out in the 
energy concept are technologically feasible.  
In spring 2011 the situation changed dramatically when the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
catastrophe tragically illustrated the technology-hubris of nuclear experts. The accident 
rebutted once more the idea that the “remaining risk” of nuclear energy can be easily 
managed in a highly industrialized country. An earthquake and tsunami triggered a 
nuclear melt-down in several reactors, which resulted in radiation leaking out into the 
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environment. The costs deriving from the health impacts and resettlement of people in 
the whole region were and still are immense. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
estimated that the damage amounts to USD 83 billion, but the true costs are likely 
much higher (Hennicke & Welfens, 2012).  
This event affected energy policy around the globe, not least in Germany. The German 
government had to react to public pressure and adopted the Energiewende bill. The 
extension for the operation of NPPs was taken back and the nuclear phase-out even 
accelerated. Eight NPPs were shut down at short notice and the roadmap for the 
irrevocable exit from nuclear energy by 2022 was determined. Decades of controversy 
were suddenly overcome and the implementation of the Energiewende moved into the 
centre of political attention.  
1.4. The scientific Energiewende consensus 
It is of great importance whether Energiewende targets are seen as symbols of goodwill 
or as serious guidance for energy policy. This depends not least on the positioning of 
scientific authorities in the energy field. There is a risk that ideological inertia and vested 
interests in economy, society and politics lead to a questioning of the direction and the 
objectives of reforms of the energy system. Currently, there is broad consensus about 
the key elements of the Energiewende, a consensus that is based on a comprehensive 
knowledge base. This combination of knowledge base and consensus cannot be found 
in many other countries. It is a key enabling factor of the German Energiewende today, 
but it has been a long and bumpy road to get there.  
Various institutes representing different scientific disciplines in Germany have brought 
about a multitude of thoughts, scenarios and data analyses which document without a 
doubt: nuclear phase-out, climate change mitigation and resource conservation can be 
achieved with justifiable macroeconomic effort in the medium term, and will in the 
longer term create significant benefits for the German economy. However, 
implementation requires a paradigm shift towards a creative and (pro-)active State and 
a larger policy focus on energy efficiency. 
Figure 1 presents three representative long-term scenarios for Germany. They all imply 
large efficiency improvements, a radical shift towards more renewable energy, and they 
also calculate with consistent economic growth. 
Total primary energy supply decreases from about 13 000 PJ in 2014 to between 6 000 
PJ and just below 8 000 PJ in 2050. All scenarios display a reduction of CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion by at least 80% compared to 1990. Thus, there is strong scientific 
evidence that absolute decoupling of energy consumption and CO2 emissions from a 
moderately increasing GDP is feasible by 2050. Furthermore, many risks of the current 
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energy system (import dependence, climate change, and nuclear radiation) can be 
drastically reduced. Unfortunately, current German energy policy has its largest 
shortcomings in respect of one of the key assumptions of all scenarios: that primary 
energy supply will decrease to half of its current value.  
 
  
Figure 1:  
Comparison of primary energy supply in 2014 and representative scenarios for German primary energy supply in 
2050 (in PJ/a) (source: Sascha Samadi, Wuppertal Institute) 
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2. The Energiewende is feasible – key 
features of the transition 
 The Energiewende in the electricity sector has had a very dynamic start, while 
the heat and transportation sectors have been lagging behind. 
 Quantitative scenarios show that the deployment of renewable energy 
technology must be accompanied by large energy savings on the demand side 
in order to achieve the ambitious targets of the Energiewende. 
 Current policy programmes – in particular in respect of energy efficiency – are 
not sufficient to trigger the required short-term (2020) and long-term (2050) 
developments. 
In 2015 it is clearer than ever: the Energiewende is ecologically necessary, technically 
feasible and economically beneficial. However, structurally and politically it is still in 
its infancy. The multitude of existing scenario analyses have been used here to 
synthesize some key structural elements that are needed for a successful transition. 
Furthermore, one current representative study is presented (Nitsch, 2014). This study 
was also the basis for the lead scenarios that guide the work of the Ministry for the 
Environment. 
It is important to consider that the following statements are based on modelling work 
that builds on “what-if” assumptions. Quantitative results should neither be seen as 
empirical facts nor as a probable projection. They constitute scientifically backed and 
technically feasible “room to manoeuvre”. It is up to us all, which options become 
reality. 
2.1. Basic structural elements of the transition 
The Energiewende is based on a broad political consensus for the comprehensive 
restructuring of the German energy system. This consensus is the first milestone on the 
way to a sustainable energy and climate policy. The overall target of reducing GHG 
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emissions by 80-95% by 2050 implies a virtually emission-free energy supply by that 
time. This transformation of the energy system rests on two pillars: increased energy 
efficiency in all sectors and covering the remaining demand with renewable energy. 
The quantitative targets for both energy efficiency and renewable energy over time are 
the result of a large number of scenario calculations, simulation and systems analyses. 
They have modelled with increasing complexity the potential pathways towards a 
sustainable energy system. Taking into account only the most important studies over 
the last 15 years, there is a long list including publications from the German 
Environmental Protection Agency (UBA), Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy 
Systems (ISE), Federal Ministry for the Environment, Renewable Energy Research 
Association (FVEE), Research Centre for Energy Economics (FfE), Institute of Energy 
Economics (EWI), German Advisory Council on the Environment, WWF and 
Greenpeace.  
The latest studies confirm that the targets of the Energiewende are reasonable and that 
the achievement of the desired energy efficiency improvements and expansion of 
renewable energy will warrant the steep reduction in GHG emissions that is needed (cf. 
EWI, GWS, & Prognos, 2014; Nitsch, 2014; UBA, 2014). There is no need to change 
the target system. When it comes to the design of the future energy system, scenario 
analyses provide general orientation for the key success factors: 
 The Energiewende in the power sector has been accelerated with the decision 
for nuclear phase-out and the support for electricity from renewable energy 
sources. This momentum has to be sustained, while the Energiewende in the 
heat and transport sectors is still much too slow and requires more effective 
public intervention. 
 Tapping into energy efficiency potentials is needed in all sectors, but in 
particular the heat and transport sectors need further attention as the lion’s 
share of reduction in energy consumption is planned there. Moreover, 
structural adaptations in these sectors are a precondition for optimal use of 
renewable energy (e.g. expansion of district heating, modal shift in 
transportation, and new mobility concepts). 
 The power system will take an even more prominent role in the whole energy 
system. The challenge to integrate large amounts of intermittent power from 
solar and wind is another strong argument for energy saving. Renewable 
electricity will become the main “primary energy source” and both the 
structure and the market design of the power system need to be adjusted to the 
dominance of intermittent energy with near zero marginal costs. The 
remaining load has to be taken on by highly efficient, flexible fossil fuel plants 
(e.g. CHP with heat storage). 
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 Sufficient capacity for balancing and transporting energy (especially in power 
grids), as well as the interplay between different sectors of the energy system 
are crucial for the efficient usage of increasing volumes of power from 
renewable energy sources. Systems such as “Power to heat”, “Power to 
mobility” and “Power to gas” will become increasingly important. These have 
to be optimized in connection with the existing storage options. 
 In contrast to energy use in the heat and transport sectors, an absolute decrease 
in electricity consumption cannot be expected. While efficiency at the point of 
final consumption of electricity is of utmost importance, the replacement of 
fossil fuel with renewable power will trigger an absolute increase in power 
consumption in the long-run.  
 Complexity of energy supply will increase and the relation between central and 
decentral energy supply will change fundamentally. Despite decentral 
renewable power generation, there will still be central building blocks, such as 
large offshore windfarms or renewable power imports. Interconnection at all 
levels will be crucial for balancing supply and demand (“smart grids”). 
 There is a constant need to adapt the energy system and its network to 
changing conditions and further develop it at local, regional and interregional 
levels. This requires a large number of capable actors at all levels, ideally 
operating under equitable, fair conditions. In order to achieve a market driven 
optimization, price signals that reflect the full external costs, including the cost 
of climate change, are absolutely necessary. 
2.2. Two pillars: increased energy efficiency and 
renewable energy 
In order to better understand the challenges of the Energiewende, it is useful to compare 
a target-fulfilment scenario (“what needs to happen”) with a reference scenario (“what 
will happen if nothing changes”). The scenarios used for this purpose are labelled 
“Scenario 100”, which represents the successful decarbonization of the energy system, 
and  scenario “GROKO” (GROKO stands for “Große Koalition”; Eng. “grand 
coalition”), which models the continuation of trends that are evolving from the 
coalition agreement of the current government (see Figure 2). Both scenarios build 
upon the models used by the Federal Ministry for the Environment (Nitsch, 2014).  
Scenario 100 illustrates well that by 2030 structural change of the energy system will 
have had to take place and the Energiewende will need to be in full swing, if targets are 
to be achieved. The scenario results in a CO2 emissions reduction of 43% in 2020 and 
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86% in 2050 (base year 1990). As the government is committed to the Energiewende, 
credible energy policy measures have to be enacted in the near future. This is the only 
way that the deep decarbonization of the energy system, as reflected in scenario 100, 
can be commenced. 
The need for additional political intervention becomes even clearer when analyzing the 
GROKO scenario, which clearly misses the climate change mitigation targets. The 
scenario displays CO2 reductions of 32% in 2020 and 42% in 2030. This reflects a 
continuation of the reduction trajectory in the 2000-2011 period. Climate targets are 
missed in this scenario as energy efficiency potentials cannot be activated. Furthermore, 
current policy has slowed down the dynamics in the growth of electricity from 
renewable sources and does not succeed in creating new incentives for the stagnating 
renewable heat sector. 
 
Figure 2:  
Development of CO2 emissions from energy (incl. industrial processes) until 2013 and two scenarios for reduction 
pathways (source: Nitsch, 2014) 
Both energy efficiency and renewable energies are needed to reach the targets. This 
becomes clear when looking at the development of primary energy supply (see Figure 
3). The required reduction in primary energy consumption can only be realized if 
strong incentives are enacted immediately (e.g. the effective implementation of the EU 
Energy Efficiency Directive in national decrees and legislation). The continuation of 
the actual trend of the last decade will lead to energy savings that fall significantly short 
of the Energiewende targets.  
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The third National Energy Efficiency Action Plan of 2014 acknowledges this 
“efficiency-gap” explicitly, but does not make any great effort to fill it. Even if all 
additional measures of the action plan are to be implemented they are most likely not 
enough to reach the 20% reduction target in 2020. If continued, the non-intervening 
energy policy will at best result in a reduction of primary energy consumption by 30% 
by 2050. In contrast, several studies have clearly shown that the reductions targeted in 
the Energiewende (as displayed by scenario 100) are achievable (DENA, 2012; Kohler, 
Joest, Peters, & Stolte, 2013). 
 
Figure 3:  
Development of primary energy consumption and renewable energy supply in two scenarios (source: Nitsch, 2014) 
Despite the very encouraging development of renewable energy in Germany in the last 
decade, the scenario comparison makes it very clear that a slowdown in the growth of 
renewable energy is not possible if the Energiewende targets are to be achieved. Even if 
energy efficiency targets are fully achieved, recent growth rates of renewable energy have 
to be maintained in order to reach the targeted CO2 emissions reductions. There is a 
substantial risk that policymakers might take the truly remarkable success of renewable 
energy in the power sector as a reason to slow down the pace in order to satisfy 
conservatives who continue to repeat their mantra of electricity shortages and exploding 
costs. 
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2.3. The power sector and its challenge of fluctuating 
supply 
The power sector and its growth of the share of renewable energy are currently at the 
centre of the Energiewende debate. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is the only 
area where an actual transition has already been initiated. Secondly, there is a lot of 
friction caused by the incompatibility of the current market design and the 
requirements set by volatile renewable power generation at zero marginal costs. 
Moreover, power consumption is also determined by various factors. In the medium-
term (until about 2025), reductions in consumption will be driven mainly by tapping 
energy-efficiency potentials of existing power-consuming sectors and applications. The 
increasing share of renewable power has, however, an impact on the applications that 
are run on electricity. Electric vehicles, heat pumps and – in the longer term – hydrogen 
and other power-to-gas technologies will enter the market as they are suitable for using 
cheap “excess” power generation from intermittent renewable energy. The share of 
these applications is expected to grow substantially and reach in the long term a share 
in overall consumption that is comparable to that of today’s existing consumers. 
Scenario 100 calculates with a share of electricity in final energy of 65% by 2060, of 
which 95% will be generated from renewable energy sources. This includes both direct 
and indirect power use via power-to-gas technology.  
Thus the sum of future electricity use is a result of income, energy prices, and energy 
efficiency improvements as well as the growth of renewable power generation. Total 
electricity consumption is therefore expected to grow despite considerable efficiency 
improvements in energy transformation and final consumption. Consumption will 
increase all the more, the faster the transition towards a renewable power sector takes 
place.  
The transformations described above will change the power supply structure completely 
(see Figure 4). The total capacity of all power plants will increase from 183 GW to 266 
GW in 2030 and 370 GW in 2060. The added capacity will be dominated by new wind 
power and photovoltaics. Their capacity of 78 GW in 2013 corresponded to 35% of total 
capacity, while their share in power generation was 12%. This will increase to 60% of all 
capacity and 45% of power generation in 2030, and 70% and 55% respectively in 2060. 
Integrating peaks of power generation from renewables as well as securing supply in times 
of very low wind and solar power generation is a substantial but manageable challenge. 
Production peaks until 2030 can be fully exploited by applying load management, 
conventional storage systems, by using power for heating as well as electric vehicles. 
Disconnecting renewable power plants in cases of extreme peaks is another option, which 
will result in marginal losses. The precondition for dealing with intermittent power from 
renewable energy is a functioning transport and distribution grid in order to balance 
spatial differences in the supply with renewable energy.  
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Figure 4:  
Development of gross power generation capacity by technology in scenario 100 (source: Nitsch, 2014) 
As the share of renewable power generation continues to grow after 2030, excess 
production will increasingly be turned into storable energy carriers. These energy 
carriers are subsequently converted back into electricity in efficient CHP plants, or are 
used as fuel in transport and industry. In 2030 only 2% of renewable electricity will be 
used for hydrogen production, in 2059 it will be 23%, and in 2060 in excess of a third 
of all renewable power. 
The large increase in total capacity brings with it an increase in intermittent capacity. 
Nevertheless, the peak load (of about 85-95 GW) is always covered. Until 2040 this 
will mainly be achieved by thermal power plants, while the share of coal decreases and 
the share of natural gas increases, increasingly supported by bio energy and geothermal 
power plants. Later, CHP plants (based on renewable hydrogen or methane) will be 
added to the mix, with solar thermal power contributing, and a small share of assured 
capacity also being provided by widely interconnected wind power plants. 
Furthermore, the capacity of local storage will increase1. Scenario 100 foresees a decline 
in capacity of conventional power plants from 101 GW (incl. nuclear power) to 82 
GW in 2030 and 22 GW in 2060. At that time the combined capacity of power from 
                                                     
1 Another option for using large excess power from renewable energy and providing assured capacity, 
namely the integration with Scandinavian hydropower and pump storage, is not considered in this 
scenario. 
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biomass, geothermal energy, storage sites, and CHP plants (based on 
hydrogen/methane) will be 50 GW (see Figure 4). 
In order to remain on the trajectory of scenario 100, the reorganization of thermal 
power generation towards natural gas has to be initiated and pushed ahead as soon as 
possible. Power generation from coal is supposed to decrease by 2020 by 40% as 
compared to 2013, and its capacity will decrease from 61 GW to 42 GW. This means, 
of course, that no new coal-fired power plants can be built and several old plants have 
to be retired. At the same time the capacity of (heat and) power plants that run on 
natural gas has to increase from 8 to 36 GW. As a continuation of this trend, lignite 
will no longer contribute to power generation from 2040 onwards. 
Actual developments in recent years do not reflect the trend needed. The contribution 
of coal (and lignite in particular) has not yet started to decline. There is a clear need for 
further political intervention, which has to include a revival of the emissions trading 
system (ETS). The ETS has not managed so far to give the incentives to switch 
generation from coal to natural gas. As a consequence of low emission allowance prices, 
modern natural gas plants are idling or even being shut down and investment in 
additional capacity is being delayed.  Additional incentives for the provision of 
conventional power-generating capacity (e.g. capacity markets) should be limited to 
highly efficient, flexible gas-fired CHP plants.  
2.4.  The Energiewende in the heat sector 
Currently, 58% of final energy is used as heat (heating, warm water, process heat) which 
causes about 50% of energy-related CO2 emissions (420 Mt in 2013). Hence, a 
successful transformation of the heat sector is absolutely crucial for the success of the 
Energiewende. This is a commonly ignored factor in the current debate. As long as 
there are no comparable dynamics in the heat sector as those initiated in the power 
sector, talking about an Energiewende is out of question. Structural adjustments and 
changes will be at least as radical as in the power sector and will depend on two key 
building blocks. Firstly, the deep, comprehensive energy renovation of existing 
buildings needs to be accelerated, requiring at least a doubling of the current annual 
renovation rate. Secondly, stronger incentives are needed for the pick-up of the 
renewable heat market, e.g. for solar collectors. If these elements of energy policy are 
implemented in the near future, a development as illustrated in Figure 5 is feasible. 
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Figure 5:  
Development of heat generation by technology in scenario 100 (source: Nitsch, 2014) 
In scenario 100 the energy demand for heat decreases by 15% until 2020, by 28% until 
2030, and by 50% in the longer term. The main share of this reduction will be achieved 
by increasing efficiency and decreasing energy consumption for space heating, e.g. by 
the replacement of today’s individual oil and natural gas heating systems with small-
scale district heating based on renewable energy sources. 
2.5. And what about transport? 
The Energiewende has not started in the transport sector either. At 185 Mt CO2 per 
year, 22% of CO2 emissions are caused by transportation and there is no trend of 
emission reductions yet. Furthermore, the share of renewables in final energy 
consumption of transport is still very low at about 6%. In scenario 100 the contribution 
of bio fuels to final energy remains very limited, as the domestic bio energy potential is 
more efficiently used in stationary plants (i.e. for heating) and the German government 
restricts the import of biomass. That means that besides efficiency improvement, 
electricity from renewable energy will become the main fuel for transportation, either 
directly in electric vehicles or indirectly via transformation into hydrogen or methane. 
Future energy consumption in the transport sector will be significantly determined by 
the growth of freight transport, which – in contrast to passenger transport – still 
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involves increasing energy consumption. In the short to medium term, emission 
reduction will be achieved mainly by substantial efficiency improvements, a modal shift 
between means of transport and the changing mobility needs. Thus, final energy 
consumption in the scenario will decrease by 10% by 2020, 22% by 2030 and 41% by 
2050 (see Figure 6). 
Until 2030 the main contribution of renewable energy to the energy needs in the 
transport sector will come from bio fuels, whose share will increase to 12.5%. After that 
it is only electricity from renewable energy sources and hydrogen from renewable 
energy that will take significantly increasing shares. Until 2050 half of personal 
transport will be based on electric and hybrid electric vehicles, the rest being covered 
by biofuels and hydrogen. Thus, passenger transport on the roads will then be free of 
CO2 emissions and freight transport to a large extent. Renewable energy sources will 
cover 57% of energy needs for transport. This share will increase to 83% by 2060. Only 
aviation will still consume significant amounts of fossil fuels. The overall achievable 
emission reductions will be 75% in scenario 100. Hence, transportation can make its 
contribution towards achieving climate targets. 
 
Figure 6:  
Structure of energy supply in the transport sector in scenario 100 (source: Nitsch, 2014) 
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2.6. Synthesis of Energiewende scenarios 
There is currently no comprehensive political strategy to cope with the major challenges 
that are connected to the total restructuring of various sectors in the energy system 
within the space of a few decades. It is not credible to stick to the target system of the 
Energiewende, which includes both nuclear phase-out and deep decarbonization, but 
not to agree on additional efforts to implement it. It is very clear that for several years 
the transition dynamics in respect of energy efficiency (in particular energy renovation 
of buildings), heat supply, CHP plants and transportation will at best be insufficient. 
There is a dire need for additional activities and measures. In this context neither the 
measures under the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan nor the Climate Action 
Plan (both 2014), are sufficient.  
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3. Is the Energiewende on track?  
 Strong decoupling of CO2 emissions from GDP in Germany in the past was 
mainly driven by the decreasing energy intensity of the economy, while the 
carbon intensity of the energy mix only decreased a little and has remained 
stable over the last decade. 
 Positive achievements of the Energiewende include the nuclear phase-out, an 
increased share of renewable energy in power generation, job creation and 
municipal value added. 
 The largest challenges of the Energiewende include reducing energy 
consumption, reducing CO2 emissions more quickly, keeping electricity tariffs 
within limits and adapting power grids. 
There is clear social and scientific consensus about the need for the Energiewende, 
which comprises both the phase-out of nuclear energy and the decarbonization of the 
economy. While this consensus took decades to form, political and institutional 
steering has to start immediately so that the ambitious targets can be achieved. In order 
to illustrate the state of the Energiewende, current developments of key indicators are 
put into their historic context and the main Energiewende achievements and challenges 
are briefly summarized.  
3.1. The Energiewende indicators in a historic context 
Future scenarios clearly illustrate the feasibility of reaching Energiewende targets by 
combining large energy savings with the deployment of renewable energy technology. 
While the nuclear phase-out is agreed and unlikely to be altered, the decarbonization 
of the German energy economy remains an enormous challenge. In order to get a better 
grasp of the challenge ahead, it is useful to look back at the development of key 
macroeconomic drivers of CO2 emissions, including GDP, the energy intensity of the 
economy and the carbon intensity of energy.  
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Figure 7:  
Macroeconomic drivers of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 1990-2012 (IEA, 2014b) 
The first interesting finding when looking back at the development since 1990 (see 
Figure 7), is that CO2 emissions decreased by about 20% while per capita GDP grew 
by 35%. When looking at the drivers that enabled this strong decoupling effect, 
decreased energy intensity stands out as the main factor. Since 1990 there has been a 
consistent trend of less and less primary energy being needed to generate GDP.2 There 
are two possible explanations for this trend. Firstly, a structural change in the economy 
may have occurred, i.e. proportionately more GDP is generated from economic sectors 
with low energy intensity today than 25 years ago. These sectors include, for example, 
the service sector and trade. Secondly, individual sectors may have deployed more 
energy-efficient technologies and processes. Quantitative analyses reveal that structural 
change has not been driving energy intensity improvements. Germany is not in the 
process of de-industrialization. On the contrary, in the first decade of the 21st century 
structural change increased energy intensity (Löschel, Pothen, & Schymura, 2015). This 
is an effect that is not visible in Figure 7 as it was outbalanced by enormous 
improvements in energy-efficiency technology.  
While the German national economy is increasingly efficient in turning energy into 
GDP, it has not yet achieved a significant total reduction in final energy consumption. 
The consumption of energy has remained more or less constant at around 9000 PJ 
throughout the last 25 years and a modest reduction trend has only started in the last 
decade. The limited success of achieving an absolute reduction of energy use (despite 
large efficiency improvements) is also the reason why the concept of “decoupling” 
should be viewed critically. While the influence of GDP on energy use may have been 
                                                     
2 It is important to note that the years immediately after 1990 were heavily influenced by German 
reunification. Hence, energy intensity improvements in that period can be regarded as one-off events.  
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“softened” it is still clearly linked, or in other words “coupled”, to the development of 
economic activity. 
The reason why CO2 emissions from energy dropped significantly while energy use 
remained constant is that the carbon intensity of energy supply improved. The carbon 
intensity of the energy mix has decreased as cleaner fuels (low carbon intensity) have 
replaced dirtier fuels (high carbon intensity). Renewable energy and natural gas have 
replaced coal and oil. The effect that more renewable energy in the electricity mix has 
on overall carbon intensity will become even more visible when the nuclear phase-out 
is finalized and coal-based power generation is replaced.  
 
Figure 8:  
Final energy consumption by energy carrier 1990-2014 (AG Energiebilanzen, 2015) 
Several key lessons have been learned from the study of energy-economy indicators over 
the past 25 years: 
 The former strong decoupling of GDP from CO2 emissions was mainly driven 
by improvements in energy efficiency. Policies for the even stronger 
decoupling that is needed until 2050 need to take account of this and should 
not focus too much on adding renewable energy to the mix.  
 The second main driver of changes in energy intensity, i.e. the structural 
change of the economy, is often forgotten. So far it has not been a major driver 
of decarbonization of the German economy, but it has great potential. Shifting 
industrial production to less energy-intensive sectors, strengthening the service 
sector as well as greening the structure of energy-intensive sectors all have the 
potential of reducing energy consumption while maintaining a high level of 
employment and incomes. It must be made clear, however, that merely shifting 
energy-intensive production abroad does not reduce overall environmental 
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
7 000
8 000
9 000
10 000
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014*
PJ
Hard coal Lignite Petroleum Gases Electricity District heating Renewable energy and others
34 
impacts. Shifting for example efficient German steel production abroad may 
even increase environmental impact (“carbon leakage”). On the other hand, 
shifting business models from the mere manufacturing of cars to an integrated 
offering of mobility services is an example of structural change that reduces 
overall energy consumption and CO2 emissions.  
 The carbon intensity of the energy mix has not improved throughout the last 
ten years and, even before that, changes in the energy mix were not the main 
driver of decarbonization. As the nuclear phase-out has been agreed and 
enacted, the coal phase-out is the next major challenge that needs to be 
addressed as soon as possible, so that the carbon intensity of the energy mix 
can be reduced. 
3.2. State of the Energiewende 2015 
The German government monitors the progress of the Energiewende and publishes an 
annual report with progress indicators in the areas of renewable energy, energy 
efficiency, transport, GHGs, electricity market, costs, grid, innovation and economy. 
Despite the consultancy of an independent group of experts, the monitoring report and 
the follow-up required are completely in the hands of the Ministry for Economics. 
Rather than summarizing the government publication (Federal Ministry for Economic 
Affairs and Energy, 2014), a snap-shot of the Energiewende in mid-2015 is presented 
below. It illustrates substantial progress on the one hand and several unsolved challenges 
on the other. The Energiewende can be credited with the following achievements so 
far:  
 Up to 2015, nine NPPs have been shut down for good; if prototypes, trial and 
demonstration plants are considered, 19 NPPs have also been taken off the 
grid. The further nuclear phase-out (eight NPPs by 2022) is neither questioned 
by any relevant group in society, nor by any political party. Once nuclear 
energy was wrongly seen as a sustainable, cheap energy source, but after 40 
years of heavy conflicts nuclear energy has become history in Germany. Other 
countries have now the opportunity to avoid this costly as well as dangerous 
technological path and develop their energy systems from start without nuclear 
energy – and this is also due to the German Energiewende.  
 Gross power generation from renewable energy sources increased from 20 
TWh (3.6%) in 2000 to nearly 160 TWh (27.3%) in 2014 (AG 
Energiebilanzen, 2015). The actual development exceeded by far all the 
previous projections of scenario experts. In particular, the assessment of 
German power corporations was drastically refuted. In a media campaign from 
1993 they still claimed that, even in the long run, sun, water and wind cannot 
provide more than 4% of our power demand (see Figure 9).  
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Figure 9:  
Newspaper campaign by German energy corporations from 1993: "Asking critical questions does not mean you're an 
opponent of nuclear power". The marked text translates: “Renewable energy sources such as sun, wind or water will 
not even in the long run be able to cover more than 4% of our power demand.” 
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 Learning effects and cost digression for electricity from PV and wind energy 
also exceeded expectations: in 2013 the average cost for electricity from PV 
was 7.3 ct/kWh and from wind (onshore) 5.6 ct/kWh. It is estimated that the 
cost for electricity from PV will decrease further and reach 3-5.5 ct/kWh in 
southern and central Europe by 2035 (Fraunhofer ISE & Agora Energiewende, 
2015). With PV in particular, the German Energiewende and fierce 
international competition brought about “power for the world” that is 
affordable, decentral and sustainable, and can drive rural electrification. 
 Gross employment in the renewable energy sector reached its all-time high in 
2013 at 400 000 people employed. Despite the significant crisis in the solar 
economy, employment still stood at about 370 000 in 2014 (DIW, 2015). By 
comparison, employment in the coal and lignite sector is estimated to be about 
40 000 (DIW, 2014). 
 Even although net electricity exports increased in 2014 to 34TWh, CO2 
emissions decreased significantly after an intermediary increase between 2009 
and 2013. The temporary increase was clearly not driven by the Energiewende 
but was a result of the extremely low price for emission allowances in the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which fell to about 5 €/t CO2 
in 2014. 
 From 1990, GHG emissions decreased by more than 250Mt CO2eq to about 
990Mt CO2eq (estimation for 2014). In order to reach the target of 40% 
reduction by 2020 an annual reduction rate of 3.4% would be needed, which 
is three times the rate of the last 15 years (Agora Energiewende, 2015). 
 Public acceptance of the Energiewende is high. In a 2015 opinion poll 93% of 
Germans stated that they find the further use and expansion of renewable 
energy sources important or very important (Renewable Energies Agency, 
2014). Key factors for public acceptance are the large increase in the number 
of energy cooperatives (nearly 1000 in 2015) and the increasing share of 
citizens’ financed decentralized renewable energy (Müller & Holstenkamp, 
2015). This might reflect a decentralization trend that is driven by the 
renewable energy technology and the economics behind it, and hence can be 
replicated elsewhere by opening the market through a feed-in tariff, a diversity 
of supply and direct competition. 
 Total municipal value added by renewable energies was EUR 6.95 billion in 
2011 and a doubling is expected to take place by 2020 (Hirschl, Heinbach, 
Aretz, & Salecki, 2012). In that respect the Energiewende has already 
contributed significantly to the strengthening of the municipal economies; and 
the trend still points upwards. Considering the strained financial situation of 
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many German municipalities and the lack of investment, this is an important 
success factor of the Energiewende. 
On the downside, the following challenges remain: 
 Primary energy consumption decreased only slightly from 14 905 PJ in 1990 
to13 132 PJ in 2014 (AG Energiebilanzen, 2015). The reduction targets of the 
German government for 2020 (11 504 PJ) and for 2050 (7 190 PJ) require a 
paradigm shift towards an accelerated energy-saving policy. Germany is still far 
away from a systematic approach for primary energy reduction. 
 The lack of energy savings is partly due to the lack of ambitious Energiewende 
policies in the building and transport sectors. Current regulation and support 
for building efficiency does not reflect at all the planned doubling of the energy 
renovation rate. Besides policy ambition there is a great need for the 
development of new policies and their integration across sectors. The 
Energiewende needs the support of a comprehensive and structured set of 
policies. 
 Compared against the binding targets of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive 
(reduction of 20% by 2020) and the ambitious targets of the German energy 
concept (see Table 1), a clear implementation deficit of the energy savings 
potential can be observed. The neoliberal idea that market-based instruments 
are sufficient for reaching ambitious energy-saving targets still dominates 
official energy policy. The EU parliament is more progressive by demanding a 
binding energy-saving target of 40% by 2030.  
 In order to reach the GHG reduction targets by 2020 (40%) and 2050 (at least 
80%) a complementary phase-out of power generation from coal is necessary. 
The 30 largest German coal-fired power plants alone emit 239Mt CO2 per 
year. The estimated shortfall of GHG emissions reduction of 62-78Mt CO2eq 
by 2020 was initially planned to be diminished by 22Mt CO2eq from the shut-
down of three older coal-fired and six lignite-fired power plants (DIW, 2014). 
 However, the German States („Länder“) and labour unions opposed the 
closure, so that new estimates now reckon on an additional GHG reduction in 
the coal sector of only 12.5Mt CO2eq (Oei, Kemfert, & von Hirschhausen, 
2015). The measures to reach this modest reduction would most likely be 
much more expensive than the levy planned initially. The gradual phase-out 
of coal and in particular lignite in the German power mix remains an immense 
challenge for the Energiewende. 
 There is a critical public debate about increased electricity tariffs for 
households and SMEs and the exemptions granted to large industry players. 
The average electricity price for households increased from 13.9 ct/kWh 
(2000) to a maximum of 29.1 ct/kWh (2014). The maximum contribution of 
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the renewable energy surcharge has been 6.2 ct/kWh in 2014. A large 
redistribution effect towards industry could be observed as the sum of 
exemptions from the surcharge, reduced transmission costs and the free 
allocation of emission allowances increased from EUR 9.4 billion in 2007 by 
political intervention to EUR 16.8 billion in 2013. 
 Management challenges of fluctuating power generation from PV and wind 
have so far been mastered without any power shortages or even black-outs. 
However, considerable challenges in the development of more flexibility in the 
system remain. The extension of the high-voltage grid is under way but far 
from finished. Currently the construction of north-south grid interconnectors 
and the connection of offshore wind parks to the grid are particularly 
challenging. Moreover, additional power storage is needed. The development 
of smart grids and load management needs further advancement. The 
integration and wide deployment of combined heat and power plants has not 
yet come very far. And the stationary and mobile use of renewable electricity 
needs to be better integrated.  
 Local acceptance for the new construction of wind parks and electricity grids 
is facing resistance. In order not to jeopardize the broad support for the 
Energiewende, it is absolutely crucial to allow public participation and have a 
truly transparent dialogue. The “not in my backyard” attitude (NIMBYism) is 
often the result of planning deficiencies rather than a more fundamental 
opposition. Keeping parts of the economic benefits within the respective 
municipalities is a success factor for increased acceptance.
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4. What are the benefits of an 
integrated Energiewende? 
 Multiple quantitative studies illustrate the macroeconomic benefits of the 
Energiewende in general and energy-saving measures in particular. 
 The large synergies between resource efficiency and energy efficiency mean that 
integrating policies in these two areas is very beneficial. 
 Co-benefits of the Energiewende include conservation of fossil resources, 
strengthening of regional value added, job creation, and reducing the 
concentration of market power. 
The remarkably high, stable public acceptance of the Energiewende project may be 
explained by the desire to contrast the large crises and failures of our time with a positive 
vision, which goes beyond the current generation. Wide identification with the project 
can trigger unused potential for creativity and motivation. A previous example of this 
type of project is the American Apollo Programme of the 60s, which within a decade 
achieved the unthinkable: the first human on the moon.  
The German Energiewende has almost achieved its first milestone, the phase-out of 
nuclear energy. While the last NPP will not be taken off-grid until in 2022 and the 
challenge of managing nuclear waste has still not been solved, the “nuclear problem” 
has certainly been solved from society’s perspective as another pull-out from the phase-
out is virtually impossible. From its roots in the anti-nuclear movement the 
Energiewende has now evolved into a constructive project that centres on economic 
performance and climate change mitigation.  
From a psychological perspective it is understandable that the argument of risk-
minimization slowly loses relevance and economic arguments become more important. 
Exploding costs and the fear of “de-industrialization” accompany almost every 
economic debate about the Energiewende. It is important to differentiate between 
purposeful attacks against the Energiewende and justified worries of low income 
households and SMEs. Motivation for and acceptance of the common Energiewende 
project would only dwindle if it entailed costs that are perceived to be unacceptable and 
unequally distributed. So far the debate has not reached this point. 
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The unequal development of power tariffs for households and small-scale consumers 
on the one hand (large increase) and energy-intensive industry on the other hand 
(constant level) may challenge the considerable public support, if and only if the 
Energiewende debate is not transparent and narrowed down to temporary price 
developments in the power sector. Thus, a thorough public examination of the costs 
and benefits of the Energiewende is absolutely necessary. 
4.1. Estimating economic benefits 
It is a commonly repeated myth that the Energiewende costs exorbitant sums of money 
and cannot be financed. A good example of this is the claim by former Minister for the 
Environment Peter Altmaier in 2013 that the Energiewende will come at a cost of a 
staggering one trillion Euros. This counterproductive statement was not very 
convincing as Altmaier did not confront his (controversial) summing up of costs with 
economic and social benefits, suggesting a wastage of public money without the 
creation of real benefits (Reuster & Küchler, 2013). Accordingly, the following remarks 
will illustrate that money put into the Energiewende is well invested from a purely 
economic perspective. 
The general macroeconomic cost dynamics of the Energiewende are as follows: an 
energy system based on a high share of renewable energy and massive energy efficiency 
improvements, hence substituting most fossil and all nuclear fuels, will in 20 years be 
“cheaper” than the continuation of the current system. This is certainly the case, if 
avoided external costs of fossil-nuclear energy supply and the potential cost increase of 
fossil fuels are also considered. Still, the economic costs will probably exceed the 
immediate benefits for a limited transition period. The system costs for energy supply 
are modelled in annually updated studies for the Ministry of the Environment. 
A comprehensive long-term evaluation of the economic effects of the Energiewende has 
not yet been carried out. This is not surprising as long-term scenarios (2030 and 2050) 
of monetary costs and benefits are inherently uncertain as they depend on many 
assumptions regarding the development of key factors (e.g. energy prices and financing 
costs). Moreover, it is virtually impossible to model the structural change that is 
triggered by the Energiewende, including the development of new business fields 
(“Cleantech”), the dynamics of innovation (“disruptive innovation”) and the 
accompanying social transformation (“sustainable consumption and production”).  
The large number of sectoral studies and plausibility considerations leads to the 
conclusion that the Energiewende pushes ahead with beneficial ecological 
modernization, including the creation of new enterprises and new jobs as well as 
increasing competitiveness on the global markets of the future (“the green race”). In 
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the following section we argue that energy savings are necessary to realize the full 
economic benefits of the Energiewende (section 4.2) and present selected studies about 
the economics of energy efficiency. 
4.2. Priority to energy savings 
Electricity from renewable sources is not only at the centre of public perception and 
political debate, but is also the main subject of economic analysis. This is 
understandable considering the visibility and dynamics of change in the power sector. 
Still, it risks losing sight of the initial comprehensive target system of the Energiewende 
– a world without nuclear, coal and oil. If, however, the visionary perspective of a “soft 
energy path” (cf. Hennicke et al., 1985; Lovins, 1979) guides the transition, the 
demand side of the energy market has to move back into the centre of analysis and 
policy-making; priority should be given to policy for energy saving.  
Saving energy and fostering the efficiency revolution is the cheapest, most 
comprehensive and potentially quickest element of the Energiewende. Hence, it is at 
the very core of this study. Energy saving and efficiency improvements create new 
governance challenges in the policy process and the initiation of social transformation 
processes. The central paradigm shift in the redesign of the energy system can be found 
in the primacy of rational energy consumption and consumer needs for energy services. 
The formation process behind the Energiewende should be guided by following 
principles:  
 Phase out the use of nuclear and fossil fuels as soon as possible. 
 Make sure socially useful consumer needs are satisfied. 
 Deploy as much renewable-energy technology as needed, but as little as 
possible – always in accordance with social and environmental standards. 
It is important to keep all three aspects in mind when shifting towards a fully renewable 
energy system, as the massive new renewable energy capacity comes along with 
considerable interference in the natural environment and cultural landscapes, and 
requires the use of large amounts of strategically important metals. 
If the economic potentials for efficient energy-saving technology are not tapped more 
consistently, the implementation of the Energiewende, if then still feasible at all, will 
come at a significantly higher cost and with lower public acceptance.  This includes 
questioning both the amount and type of energy services we are consuming today. Even 
the most efficient use of energy can coincide with higher total consumption that is 
driven by effects of rebound, comfort and growth (see also chapter 5.1). Hence, the 
Energiewende also includes changes in lifestyle and the development of new models 
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and understanding of prosperity. Do we actually need larger and larger dwellings, 
shopping arcades that mutate into temples of consumption, bigger flat-screens in our 
households, more powerful cars and excessive long-distance travel? Or can we live well 
and run the economy without all of the above, i.e. have an energy-sufficient lifestyle?  
Note that asking “how much is enough” and arguing for sustainable consumption and 
production patterns does not undermine energy efficiency and saving. It is rather a call 
to combine efficiency and sufficiency policies, in order to avoid efficiency 
improvements being nullified by increased consumption of more energy services. The 
combination of energy efficiency and sufficiency can: 
 make the transition towards an energy economy based 100% on renewable 
sources quicker and cheaper. If primary energy consumption can be cut by 
50% by 2050, the current amount of energy from renewable sources “only” 
needs to be tripled. This reduces costs significantly, not least for grid 
integration and storage;  
 maximize macroeconomic benefits, because energy-efficient buildings, 
appliances, machinery and solutions are typically cheaper at full-cost pricing 
than the non-optimized alternatives. Furthermore, energy sufficiency saves not 
only energy but also acquisition costs;  
 strengthen the global example that the Energiewende can be, as Germany 
shows – in particular towards countries in transition – that targets can be 
achieved more quickly and cheaply if wasteful patterns of production and 
consumption are abolished (or not adopted in the first place); and  
 accelerate the Energiewende altogether, because combined energy efficiency 
and sufficiency can be put into effect more quickly, and “time is our scarcest 
resource”.  
4.3. Studies of the macroeconomic effects of the 
Energiewende 
The Energiewende has triggered a multitude of mainly sectoral cost-benefit analyses of 
its economic impact. Here we only present a few key publications and findings that 
illustrate well the main economic aspects of energy efficiency improvements: 
 The DIW (German Institute for Economic Research) researched in 2013 the 
required investment into the Energiewende and its economic impact on the power 
and buildings sectors until 2020. It concludes that without a considerable increase 
in energy efficiency, the Energiewende targets are out of reach. Between 2014 and 
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2020, additional annual investments of EUR 31-38 billion are required. The 
macroeconomic effects of this investment are clearly positive. The DIW model 
specifies further that EUR 17-19 billion must be invested annually into power and 
heat production as well was EUR 6 billion into the extension of the power grids 
and (as far as required until 2020) into grid integration (e.g. energy storage and 
load management). For the pursued doubling of the energy renovation rate of the 
building stock, DIW calculates with additional investment costs of EUR 6-13 
billion per year. (Blazejczak et al., 2013) 
 In the building sector, efficiency potentials are particularly large, but challenges 
and barriers are also tough. Support programmes are necessary to overcome these 
barriers, and solid economic arguments are needed to convince politicians and 
taxpayers that support programmes are beneficial. The development bank KfW 
reported in 2012 that EUR 1.5 billion of taxpayers’ money triggered total 
investments of EUR 19.4 billion in energy-efficient construction and renovation 
by private people (Prognos, 2013). Considering the positive multiplier effects of 
this support programme on investment, employment and tax income, such a 
programme of a development bank presents itself as a win-win instrument for 
improving energy efficiency. It should be continued and ramped up. In this context 
it is important to consider the low investment rate in Germany, which is clearly 
below the EU and OECD average in the 21st century. Low investment rates 
contribute to the ageing of the capital stock and weaken technological progress. 
This results in weaker growth and employment dynamics, also in the sectors that 
are important for the Energiewende. 
 The Prognos think tank shares this view that the support programme should be 
ramped up (Prognos, 2013). The study concludes that the continuation of the 
KfW programme and a higher financial volume (EUR 5-10 billion per year to 
double the renovation rate) will result in significant positive economic effects. Even 
if the state is debt-financing the programme, a “self-financing ratio” of more than 
1 can be expected due to higher tax income.  
 The German Advisory Council on the Environment considers lowering power 
demand through energy efficiency as the least costly “bridging technology” and a 
necessary condition for keeping the costs for renewable energy as low as possible 
(SRU, 2011). The potential energy savings in industry alone amount to an 
estimated EUR 65 billion by 2030 and require investment of about EUR 9 billion 
(Bauernhansl, Mandel, Wahren, Kasprowicz, & Miehe, 2013).  
 Another study investigates the total economic effects of a strengthened efficiency 
strategy (IFEU & Fraunhofer ISI, 2011). In comparison to a reference scenario, 
the main indicators of the studied scenario “Ambitious Efficiency” will develop 
until 2030 as summarized below: 
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o GDP and private consumption increase 
o Investment increases significantly 
o Government consumption expenses are lowered 
o Energy imports are reduced by EUR 4 billion per year (91 billion in 
2010) 
o A net employment increase of 130 000 jobs in manufacturing can be 
achieved. 
4.4. Increased efficiency reduces the need for back-up 
capacity 
A particular benefit of increased efficiency in the consumption of electricity is that 
power grids are unloaded and a contribution to the security of supply is made.  
Measures to improve electricity efficiency result in lower consumption of electricity. 
To the extent that this reduction takes place at the time of peak consumption, the peak 
load that power grids have to handle can be reduced. This effect has not been utilized 
systematically, but it is very relevant for the costs and the capacity of grid extension, 
considering that a reduction of one to two percent per year is feasible. If the 2020 target 
of a 10% reduction in power consumption is achieved and if the reductions are realized 
along the current load profile, peak load will be reduced by more than 8 000 MW.  
In addition to this effect, efficiency measures can even be steered in a way so that the 
load profile is adapted to temporal and spatial specifics. Changing from electric night-
storage heating to another type of heating (ideally CHP) can, for example, reduce power 
demand in winter when power generation from PV is very low. Furthermore, electric 
ventilation, cooling and pumping often run continuously around the clock, while in 
most cases pauses in the time of peak demand are feasible without compromising the 
quality of the respective energy service.  
Against this background, the suggestion arises of investigating further the strategic 
utilization of energy-efficiency measures to strengthen the security of power supply. 
What is the potential of electric efficiency to complement other measures subsumed 
under the headings of load shifting and demand side management (DSM)? 
A current study estimates that the DSM potential for absorbing excess electricity is 
about 9 000 MW and for reducing the load on the grid up to 3 000 MW (Krzikalla, 
Achner, & Brühl, 2013). This shifting potential persists for several hours. Between half 
and two thirds of it can be contributed by industry and the remaining potential depends 
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on households (both with and without heat-pumps). The load-shifting potential for 
shorter periods is even higher in industry.  
As far back as the 1990s, Hannover’s energy utility company showed what is possible 
in respect of DSM. It contracted load-shifting in large companies that corresponded to 
about two percent of peak load, in order to minimize the need to purchase power when 
it is most expensive, i.e. during peak hours (Thomas et al., 2003). 
4.5. Controversy regarding electricity prices 
During the last 15 years the price paid for electricity has undergone different 
developments in the household sector and in the power-intensive industry sector 
respectively. It was a political decision to use a transfer mechanism that puts the 
temporary burden of significant additional costs related to wind and solar power onto 
private households and SMEs, while at the same time an increasing number of energy-
intensive companies (currently 2 200 companies) were exempt from this transfer 
(BAFA, 2015). 
This exemption has been debated as it includes many companies that do not need this 
privilege to be competitive on the international market. Furthermore, increased tariffs 
for households and SMEs were taken as an opportunity to criticize the Energiewende 
and the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in general. The surcharge for renewable 
energy is, however, only responsible for a small proportion of the overall price increase. 
Moreover, it is expected to remain on the current level of around 6.3 ct/kWh and will 
decrease in the 2020s. Whether and when the electricity price trend turns also depends 
on other political decisions about the financing of grid infrastructure and reserve 
capacity provided by large power plants (e.g. coal). 
If no counter measures are initiated (such as targeted energy-saving programmes), the 
high electricity price for households and SMEs and its negative distributive effects on 
low-income households may become the Achilles heel of the Energiewende. 
4.6. Synergies of an integrated energy and resource 
efficiency policy 
For both economic and environmental reasons the Energiewende should be 
accompanied by a resource transition and a more innovative resource efficiency policy. 
Synergies could thus be tapped that would amplify the macroeconomic benefits of 
energy efficiency policy. 
In 2002 an expert commission researched for the first time the energy-saving potential 
of closing material loops more effectively and of improving the use of materials and 
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products. Compared to a reference scenario, the following (additional) energy savings 
could be achieved in Germany by 2030 if a more active material efficiency policy were 
to be adopted: 
1. More recycling of materials (128 PJ). 
2. Lower specific material demand (193 PJ). 
3. Substitution of materials (118 PJ). 
4. Increased intensity of usage (65 PJ). 
The expert commission estimated at that time that in the reference case 465 PJ would 
already be saved (corresponding to 5% of total energy demand) and the same amount 
again with a dedicated resource efficiency policy.  
These figures still do not capture the full (cost) savings potential of an integrated 
resource and energy efficiency strategy. About 45% of the costs in the manufacturing 
industry are material costs, while energy costs make up about 2% and costs for staff 
about 20%. Total material input costs were EUR 858 billion in 2013, which illustrates 
that policy interventions for integrated material and energy efficiency have great 
potential (Destatis, 2015). 
Recent simulation exercises show that the integration of an active climate-change 
mitigation pathway with material efficiency measures will add further benefits to a 54% 
reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 (Distelkamp, Meyer, & Meyer, 2010): 
 Material consumption decreases by about 20%. 
 GDP increases by about 14%. 
 Employment increases by 1.9% (considering also demographic factors and a 
wage development that reflects productivity improvements). 
 Government debt can be reduced by about EUR 250 billion. 
The simulation concludes that a comprehensive material efficiency policy will 
strengthen Germany’s competitiveness on international markets. This pioneering study 
provides evidence that a high-tech country like Germany can achieve absolute 
decoupling of economic growth from resource consumption by combining climate-
change mitigation with progressive material efficiency efforts.  
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4.7. Co-benefits of the Energiewende 
A narrow monetary cost-benefit analysis of the Energiewende cannot capture the more 
comprehensive social benefits derived from a nuclear-free, decarbonized energy system. 
Assuming for a moment that climate change itself does not provide sufficient 
justification for the Energiewende, there are numerous additional benefits that are 
commonly summarized as the “co-benefits” of climate change mitigation(cf. Höhne, 
Day, Hänsel, & Fekete, 2015; IEA, 2014a). Several actual co-benefits and future 
opportunities of the Energiewende are summarized in Table 2. Some of these are 
discussed in more detail below. Note that co-benefits are not limited to monetary 
benefits, but typically still have a significant positive economic impact. Even though 
they are labelled co-benefits, these factors can in many cases be the main reasons why 
the Energiewende is moving forward and widely accepted by many actors. 
Table 2:  
Co-benefits of the German Energiewende 
(Co-)Benefit Description/explanation 
Conservation of scarce fossil fuels Substitution of oil and natural gas and reduction of 
import dependence  
Climate change mitigation and clean air (in 
particular in countries in transition and developing 
countries) 
Reduction of CO2 emissions and air pollution from the 
combustion of fossil energy carriers  
Strengthening of local/regional value added and job 
creation  
Substitution of energy imports by regional chain of 
economic value added  
Reducing the concentration of market power and 
assuring a diversity of actors  
Erosion of the superiority of large energy corporations 
and strengthening small-scale investors (citizen-
financing, energy cooperatives) 
Lowering the risk of wars for resources Decreased dependence on the group of countries in 
the strategic energy ellipse that stretches from the 
Arabian Peninsula to the north of Russia 
Minimizing risks related to national energy supplies  Avoiding scarcity, technical risks and price volatility 
Creating export opportunities in the 21st century Export of renewable energy technology and further 
sustainable energy systems 
Strengthening social cohesion More accessibility, participation and manageability 
Conservation of scarce fossil fuels 
A key reason for the fundamental change of our energy supply systems is the awareness 
that the energy reserves that have built up over millions of years are finite; in particular 
oil and natural gas will become scarce in the foreseeable future. The Club of Rome 
warned of energy resource scarcity as far back as 1973. Until today the general finding 
of scarce resources still holds – despite new technologies, new explorations and new 
discoveries. The “peak of fossil fuels” will occur sooner or later, but it is not going to 
be a sufficient driver for achieving the target to keep global warming below two degrees. 
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It is now more certain than ever that at most a quarter to a third of all carbon-energy 
reserves can still be burnt if climate change is to be kept within limits (IPCC, 2014; 
Meinshausen et al., 2009). This “planetary boundary” leaves little room and time for 
manoeuvre when deciding and putting into effect a global regime for the management 
of climate change. Hence, the restrictions that were once identified by the Club of Rome 
have been replaced: the boundary is not limited energy reserves in the ground, but the 
“sky”, i.e. the limited capacity of the atmosphere to cope with an increasing volume of 
GHG emissions.  
Germany’s energy import dependency is particularly high in respect of oil and gas, 
while coal consumption is mainly covered by domestic resources (see Figure 10). From 
a national resource conservation perspective, lignite mining is at the core of the debate. 
The calls to ‘keep it in the ground’ are getting ever stronger. From an energy-security 
perspective, imports of oil and natural gas (in particular from Russia) are of geopolitical 
importance. Energy security can in this context be regarded as one of the additional 
drivers of the Energiewende. 
 
Figure 10:  
Import share in primary energy consumption by fuel in 2003 and 2013 (BGR, 2014) 
There will eventually be sufficient economic reasons to move globalized markets away 
from fossil fuel exploration and combustion and towards competitive renewable energy 
solutions and energy efficiency technology. For this to happen, the steep cost digression 
of power generation from PV and wind has to continue, which requires technology and 
knowledge transfer between countries (cf. Fraunhofer ISE & Agora Energiewende, 
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2015). Furthermore, external costs of fossil fuel based power generation should be fully 
internalized, e.g. by enacting a global emission trading scheme or a CO2 tax. In 
Germany the external environmental costs are at least 9 ct/kWh, with the exception of 
natural gas at around 5 ct/kWh (UBA, 2012). Exorbitant subsidies for fossil fuels need 
to be phased out quickly and the global movement towards divestment from coal and 
other fossil fuels has to gain traction. National energy policy has limited influence on 
these global processes. Hence, the focus should be on what can be done nationally in 
the context of the Energiewende. 
Strengthening of regional value added and job creation 
Energy demand in Germany is covered by imports to the extent of 70%. Mainly oil 
and natural gas are imported. These imports come at a cost of EUR 90 billion per year. 
By using domestic renewable energy sources, an increasing share of this money remains 
in the country. At the municipal level alone, EUR 10.5 billion of value was added by 
renewable energies in 2011 (Hirschl et al., 2012).  
So far, about 370 000 jobs have been created in the renewable-energy sector, spreading 
roughly equally into the sub-sectors wind power, solar energy and biomass (DIW, 
2015). 
Reducing the concentration of market power and assuring a diversity of 
actors 
Until recently the four large energy corporations in Germany had a dominant market 
position and significant influence on political decisions at the federal and state levels 
(BKA, 2011). This dominance is waning as renewable energies expand and the 
decentralization of the energy system advances. The German Monopolies Commission 
supports this conclusion in a recent special report (Monopolkommission, 2013). 
Installations under the Renewable Energy Sources Act are mainly owned by citizens, 
while the “large four” own only 5% of the installed capacity, which is even less than 
municipal utilities (see Figure 13). 
The low participation of large energy corporations in the decentral restructuring of the 
power market is combined with the contraction of conventional power generation in 
large thermal power plants (chiefly nuclear and coal). In response to this trend E.ON 
made an announcement to split the company into two parts. The management 
identified the coexistence of the old energy world with a new energy world as a 
challenge and opportunity: “This new world, which is emerging around customers and 
their changing needs, is fundamentally different from the conventional energy supply 
system which is based on large-scale systems.” (E.ON CEO J. Thyssen, 1.12.2014). 
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How long the coexistence of the two energy worlds will last is an open question. It is 
clear, however, that the new world, which is characterized by decentral power 
generation, new business models, smart grids, and the integration of power, heat and 
mobility sectors, will grow.  
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5. Socio-economic effects of the 
Energiewende: Both sufficiency and 
efficiency are needed! 
 Direct and indirect rebound effects of energy-saving measures exist, but they 
are difficult to research and tend to be overestimated. 
 Distributional impacts, economic growth and lifestyle changes are important 
economic aspects of the Energiewende and have to be discussed together to 
avoid simplification. 
 Only an effective mix of information, financial incentives, governing with 
taxes, but also directives and bans can lead to the required economic and social 
processes of change. 
The strong decoupling of moderate economic growth (about 1% per year) from 
primary energy supply (reduction of about 50% by 2050) is at the core of Energiewende 
and will probably be its most important success factor.  
If energy efficiency improvements are outweighed by increased energy consumption, 
the Energiewende would only be possible if the economy stagnated or even shrank.  
Moreover, decarbonization could only be achieved by a very large expansion of 
renewable energy installations. Both options are faced with many problems. Hence, 
both the discussion about the meaning and extent of rebound effects and about the 
feasibility and potential outcomes of sufficiency policy are relevant for the 
implementation of the Energiewende. 
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5.1. Rebound effects as argument for, not against, 
ambitious efficiency and sufficiency policy 
Do we drive more if we have fuel-efficient cars and do we keep the lights on longer if 
we have energy-saving light bulbs? Do the energy savings of a passive house motivate 
the members of the household to fly more, so that the overall energy consumption of 
the household increases (so-called “backfiring”)? And if all of the above is the case, does 
it challenge the need for a much more progressive energy efficiency policy in Germany 
and the EU?  
No! Rebound effects have so far carried a lot of weight due to an unambitious efficiency 
policy. Therefore, it is more important than ever to enact progressive energy-saving 
policies in combination with complementary sufficiency elements. While rebound 
effects may abate, some (but not all) of the efficiency improvements in appliances, 
vehicles and buildings, climate change and resource scarcity mean that every kilowatt 
hour saved counts. What then are the strategies and the policy mix to minimize 
unwanted rebounds? This is a complex question that requires a balanced answer. 
Opponents of public intervention for energy efficiency argue that, due to the rebound 
effect, energy-efficiency measures cannot possibly make a rapid, substantial, cheap 
contribution to climate-change mitigation. On the other hand, critics of economic 
growth argue that energy and resource efficiency cannot lead to an absolute reduction 
of energy and resource consumption if economic growth continues. Hence, stagnation 
or degrowth is needed to achieve an absolute reduction of GHG emissions and other 
environmental impacts, which can be supported by historical analyses.  
Does this mean that efforts to increase energy efficiency do not work at all, that they 
may even be harmful? Or does it rather imply that energy-efficiency policy has not yet 
been sufficiently ambitious?  
What are rebounds? 
The concept of rebound effects requires a precise definition and a solid empirical base. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that the term is used as a dummy for (often justified) criticism 
of economic growth, technological optimism and excessive consumption.  
To begin with, it is important to differentiate between actual rebound effects (efficiency 
improvements as the cause of energy savings that are lower than expected) and a whole 
bundle of drivers of economic growth that is largely independent of efficiency 
improvements, including catching-up effects in consumption as well as comfort, luxury 
and lifestyle effects. In literature, three types of rebound effects are typically mentioned: 
53 
1. Direct rebound effects occur if more of the same energy service is consumed, 
i.e. more efficient buildings, appliances and vehicles are used less sparingly. 
The more efficient flat-screen TV runs longer. The fuel-efficient car is driven 
further and more frequently. 
2. Indirect rebound effects result from the fact that energy cost savings are 
typically larger than the investment in energy efficiency. This increases the 
available income, which can be used for other things than energy. Consumers 
can purchase additional products and services, for which energy is needed 
again. Producers gain additional capital for investments into new products or 
an increase of production capacity. If these additional products do not replace 
other products, it means that overall production is increased, which requires 
more energy in total. 
3. Both of the aforementioned microeconomic effects also contribute to 
macroeconomic rebound effects. Energy efficiency enhances overall 
productivity and contributes to higher economic growth, which in turn 
requires additional energy input – just like any form of increase in the 
productivity of labour and capital. Furthermore, macroeconomic effects arise 
from the influence of energy efficiency on the energy price: if energy 
consumption can be reduced significantly by implementing energy efficiency 
measures in several countries, the market price for energy will go down, which 
in turn increases demand (in other countries).  
Rebound effects are not only damaging in respect of energy and resource consumption, 
but may also have socially useful co-benefits. These include: increased prosperity and 
wellbeing (particularly in developing countries and countries in transition), less energy 
poverty, increased competitiveness on cleantech markets, and job creation. Hence, it is 
important to differentiate between unwanted and wanted rebound effects, as long as 
they are connected to significant co-benefits of energy efficiency improvements. 
How large are rebound effects in practice? 
Measuring, or rather estimating, rebound-effects is difficult and contested. This is even 
the case for direct rebound effects because, as with energy savings themselves, they only 
become apparent when comparing to a hypothetical reference case, i.e. the 
consideration of what would have happened without an energy-efficiency measure. 
The methods for analysis as well as the extent of indirect and macroeconomic rebound 
effects are subject to ongoing scientific debate. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
estimates indirect rebound effects, which occur as money saved on energy is spent on 
additional goods and services, to be about 9%, which can be further reduced with 
appropriate policy interventions (IEA, 2012). 
54 
As a rule of thumb (and due to the lack of precise data) it can be assumed that about 
25% of the energy savings that are connected to energy-efficiency improvements are 
“eaten up” by overall rebound effects (Thomas, 2012).  
How can rebound effects be prevented? 
Even though rebound effects are not as strong as frequently claimed, the fundamental 
principle still holds: “Do not waste any saved kilowatt hour!” A foresighted policy 
design should incorporate rebound effects by including a robust reduction of the 
targeted energy savings in the evaluation process. Furthermore, the energy-efficiency 
policy mix needs to include specific additional instruments that help to minimize 
rebounds. The following list gives an overview of possible elements of a policy mix that 
limits unwanted rebound effects. 
System adjustments: 
Direct:  
 Binding energy-saving targets (EU 2011/2012) 
 Energy-efficiency obligations for utilities (EU ESD 2012) 
 Reduction of subsidies and internalizing ext. cost of nuclear/fossil fuels 
 Caps, e.g. dynamic standards for fleet consumption of cars (EU) 
 Bonus/malus regulations e.g. for cars (“feebates”) 
 More ambitious targets for EU ETS  
 Progressive standards (e.g. ICT) 
 Environmental taxes (incl. energy taxes) 
 
Indirect:  
 Structural change to less resource-intensive sectors (i.e. services) 
 Promotion of renewable energy in coordination with energy efficiency 
 “ProgRess” (German Resource Efficiency Programme) 
Behavioural change: 
 Sustainable consumption, promotion of common goods, education 
 Reducing societal disparities (e.g. income, wealth, access) 
Despite the positive effects of a policy package that supports energy-efficiency 
improvements and reduces rebound effects, the effects of the orientation towards 
growth maximization remain an unsolved socio-political challenge. Hence, it is crucial 
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not only to research and consider rebound effects better, but also to create a scientific 
basis for policies to couple energy efficiency and sufficiency.  
It is a task for policymakers to decide on targets, criteria and the implementation of a 
social “sufficiency strategy”. Behavioural change of individuals is honourable and can 
persuade other people to follow, but is not sufficient to trigger a general shift towards 
sustainable production and consumption. However, individual sufficiency in 
combination with energy efficiency makes it easier to reach the social targets of the 
Energiewende. 
Growth and affluence are the main systemic drivers of energy and resource 
consumption, which cannot be limited sufficiently without political intervention, i.e. a 
coupled efficiency and sufficiency policy. It is not constructive to engage in 
undifferentiated growth-bashing, as this does not further the understanding of complex 
interactions between efficiency improvements and sustainable patterns of production 
and consumption. The “right” amount of sustainable consumption and production and 
of political intervention can only be found in a long-term democratic discourse.  
To conclude, energy efficiency remains crucial for reaching the targets of the 
Energiewende. Despite rebound effects it is still the quickest, largest and most 
economical option to mitigate climate change, secure energy supplies and support the 
green economy. An efficiency revolution is not the driver of unsustainable economic 
growth, but a necessary condition for a truly green economy. Comprehensive energy 
savings improve the ecological quality of economic development and structural change. 
They are the basis for the formation of more sustainable patterns of consumption and 
production. 
5.2. A systems perspective on changes in growth, 
distribution and lifestyle  
Discussing the economic aspects of fair distribution, growth and lifestyle separately 
from each other does not reflect their close interconnectedness and leads to many 
misjudgements in the context of a constructive sufficiency policy. Growth critics often 
neglect distributional aspects and do not answer the question: “How much is enough 
for whom?” For advocates of distributional justice the ecological “limits to growth” are 
often not a serious challenge, as long as the benefits from economic growth are used to 
balance income inequalities.  
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Impact on distribution 
It gets you thinking, if sceptics of the Energiewende suddenly demand very loudly that 
“electricity needs to remain affordable!” Are the ‘friends of coal and nuclear’ actually 
advocates of the poor? The sceptics often forget to mention increased heating and fuel 
costs and do not elaborate on further drivers of electricity price hikes. Despite the 
populist nature of many sceptics’ arguments, the problem of energy poverty is real and 
deserves attention. 
In Germany, more and more people cannot afford to heat their apartments and houses 
adequately and can hardly pay their electricity bills. People who pay more than ten 
percent of their available income for energy count as “energy-poor” according to a 
definition from the UK. This applies to about 14% in Germany.  
The main reasons for energy poverty are increasingly unequal distribution of incomes 
and of capital, as well as unequal opportunities for social participation. These trends 
cannot be reversed with even the most ambitious social energy policy. The 
Energiewende should not further intensify existing problems, so that they are not 
mistakenly presented as being causes of energy poverty.  
Energy poverty is caused by low incomes, high energy prices, inefficient buildings, 
wasteful appliances and unconscious routines of everyday life. A combination of these 
factors may cause, in the worst case, electricity or gas supplies being cut off. Hundred 
thousands of people live temporarily without power in Germany.  
Socio-political intervention alone is not enough to tackle this challenge. While it is 
necessary to adapt social transfer payments to rising energy prices, it is at the same time 
important to advise people locally about energy-efficient behaviour. For an average 
household the electricity and heat-saving potential of these adjustments alone is 
between 10 and 30 percent. Correct ventilation and keeping room temperatures at a 
moderate level can save several hundreds of Euros.  
Energy advice to households can be connected to national support programmes for the 
purchase of energy-efficient appliances, which are implemented at the local level. 
Replacing the fridge can easily save 100 Euros per year, but the initial costs are too high 
for many energy-poor households.  
Another area for intervention is the socially acceptable energy renovation of buildings. 
Poor people often live in poorly insulated buildings, which is partly due to the fact that 
the social welfare institutions only cover a low rent. The German city of Bielefeld covers 
higher rents too, if the building produces comparatively low heating costs. This is a 
cost-neutral approach for the city but increases the incentive for landlords to renovate 
dwellings.  
There are numerous options to balance the consequences of high energy prices for poor 
people. Instead of populism and polemic about “affordable energy” it is more important 
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to develop and implement target group-specific, energy-saving concepts. This creates 
acceptance among those in need, improves overall welfare and strengthens democracy. 
While poor people should use energy as efficiently as possible, it also needs to be 
pointed out that poor people already consume less electricity than the average. The 
more affluent citizens are, the more energy they consume.  
Impact on economic growth 
Ever since the oil crises in the 70s, potential limits to growth have been discussed. This 
discussion is coined by two opposing streams. The first one assumes that production 
and consumption can be increased almost without any limits. If this increase is halted 
at some point in the distant future, there will already be alternative “green” 
technologies. In order to develop these technologies economic growth is needed.  
The second stream argues that the maximum limit for extracting finite resources and 
the capacity of sinks to absorb emissions (e.g. CO2 into the atmosphere) are lower than 
often assumed. By developing and deploying new technologies the increase in resource 
extraction can at best be limited; but it cannot be reduced to a responsible level. 
Economic growth counteracts climate change mitigation efforts. What is needed are 
business models and lifestyles that conserve resources and nature.  
Which of the two streams is right? The “green growth” perspective sounds very 
attractive and reassuring, but the proponents fail to explain compellingly how this can 
be achieved without additional public debt and increased resource consumption.  
The interaction of consumers and producers drives a continuous increase in material 
production, more and more capital is invested and more and more products are bought. 
The standard of comfort increases every year: cars become heavier; TVs, refrigerators 
and dwellings larger; and even shrinking cities continuously open new construction and 
industrial areas. International airports in the vicinity have become the standard, 
passenger numbers increase, and new runways are planned and constructed. Roads are 
frequently congested, even although the capacity of many “Autobahnen” has been 
increased to six or even eight lanes. Many thousand kilometres of roads are still to be 
built, if everything goes according to plan.  
There is still hope that technological and social innovations will in future enable an 
absolute decoupling of economic growth from environmental degradation. Renewed 
attention to the circular economy, the emergence of the sharing economy, and progress 
in the use of renewable materials and energy are first steps towards a comprehensive 
ecological transformation. Its technological feasibility for a whole economy has so far 
only been demonstrated in scenarios.  
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Reduce economic growth dependence 
Indeed, it is not a straightforward task to steer economic growth in a way that implies 
absolute decoupling from resource consumption. Just imagine: municipalities and 
regions would no longer offer space for new dwellings, industrial parks and roads; at 
Volkswagen the number of cars produced would stagnate [not such an unlikely scenario 
any longer as at the time of revising this text the Volkswagen scandal around 
manipulated diesel engines unfolds]; the port of Hamburg would dismiss expansion 
plans and freeze the number of containers it can handle. What would happen? The 
economic crisis in 2008/09 gave a first taste of potential economic impacts. Without 
an alternative concept, unemployment would rise if the economy stagnates. The social 
welfare system would be at stake. Social unrest would become more likely.  
Pushing the topic aside is not a solution as the “growth-question” is not only a challenge 
of the Energiewende but of all sustainability policy. If it remains unaddressed it will be 
nearly impossible to establish a set of rules that limits the wasteful use of resources such 
as zinc, indium, oil, natural gas etc. Requirements that may slow down growth are, so 
far, often off-limits. Abandoning privileges for company cars, for example, may decrease 
the sales of large (often German) diesel cars. The same holds true for strict CO2 
emission limits. Even the modest ticket tax on air travel is criticized, because it may 
slow down the growth of airports; and, of course, taxing kerosene would dampen 
growth, too. For similar reasons most resources are untaxed, the number of CO2 
emission allowances is too high to result in an appropriate carbon price, there are no 
stricter regulations for more ethical husbandry, there is no serious tax on financial 
transactions, the regulation of the financial sector is not as tough as it should be, and 
so forth. Even a general speed limit on German motorways, a measure that is connected 
to multiple benefits, fails because it may hamper the growth of car manufacturers or 
drastically change their model ranges. 
Avoid a race to the bottom 
The unlimited addiction to economic growth can trigger a severe downward trend. 
Companies want to make as much money as possible. They do not typically shift round 
production only to do good for future generations. If ecological concepts make 
production more expensive this may constitute a competitive disadvantage. Companies 
on the stock markets will consider climate change and the limited nature of resources 
only if they pay off. The steel industry has, for example, invested heavily in efficient 
technology, but with a payback horizon of two to three years. Any investment beyond 
that threshold is only made if it is required by law, since investors are typically unwilling 
to wait any longer for their returns. 
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Why should an energy utility support its customers in improving their energy efficiency 
if their competitors are not doing it? If, however, there is a general requirement to do 
so, managers have a much better standing in relation to investors.  
Even whole cities are in a comparable situation. There are few mayors who dare to 
restrict motorized traffic in their cities. One criticism they face is that people from the 
surrounding regions will go to the neighbouring city to shop, which will be bad for the 
retail sector, bad for the local economy, bad for employment. Similar arguments are 
brought forward to develop green space into business areas or dwellings. This is a 
strategy to secure the municipal tax base, which is made up of the local business tax and 
the municipal share of the income tax. The underlying thought is: if we do not offer 
new housing opportunities and easily accessible shopping opportunities, the 
neighbouring municipality will do it, and they already attract people with low taxes and 
the dumping of prices for construction land. 
This destructive competition drives cities and municipalities further into the 
construction and expansion of roads and airports. Decision-makers are quite aware that 
the increase in aviation accelerates global warming and that whole districts are polluted 
with noise. The perceived risk of missing out on state-of-the-art infrastructure and 
developments seems to be greater, however. It is a race that most of the participants can 
only lose. Consultations and agreements between municipalities are one way to avoid 
destructive competition. Another way is to change the rules of the game, i.e. changes 
in the national policy framework.  
Support Corporate Social Responsibility 
Finally, countries too can engage in destructive competition. Economists talk about a 
“race to the bottom” when social, environmental and labour standards are lowered 
further and further in global competition. The news is full of reports about companies 
with astronomic value on the stock market and making minimal tax payments. In the 
search for tax havens these companies play off countries against each other.  
More and more managers have recognized the race to the bottom; and off-the-record 
they demand a stricter regulatory framework to make progress in respect of various 
sustainability challenges. The United Nations and the consultancy Accenture surveyed 
1 000 CEOs from 100 countries and surprisingly found that eight in ten wish for more 
radical requirements from policy (United Nations, 2015). Government intervention at 
international, national and local level is crucial to move from sporadic improvements 
to a collective transformation process towards sustainability.  
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Combine the ‘carrot and the stick’ policies 
An honest assessment of all relevant socio-economic aspects will come to the conclusion 
that the promise of green energy technologies alone is certainly not enough. More than 
40 years ago the UN Conference on the Human Environment established the guiding 
concept of “qualitative growth”. In the decades since then, absolute resource and energy 
consumption in industrial countries could not be reduced. Technology optimists may 
still oppose and claim that, in the future, electric vehicles will become the standard and 
aircraft will become more efficient and mainly run on bio fuels. Buildings will no longer 
consume energy but will generate it.  
Yes, much will become technically feasible. Yet, if technological progress remains the 
only substantial progress, not much will change. Aircraft will become more efficient, 
but this will remain without effect if air travel also continues to increase. The depth of 
this challenge becomes apparent when considering that even the avant-garde of the 
environmental movement can hardly resist long-distance flights to India or New 
Zealand; due to a notorious lack of time, tumble driers are an unfortunate necessity.  
For all sectors of the economy and areas of consumption it is essential to consider that 
renewable energy and energy efficiency are only sustainable solutions if growth in 
luxury, size and comfort can be kept within limits. Hence, it remains an open question 
whether and to what degree the absolute decoupling of economic growth from 
environmental degradation and resource consumption is feasible in industrialized 
countries like Germany. What is certain is that it will not be realized through lifestyle 
changes alone; a policy framework that is both demanding and supportive is required. 
The most important decisions contributing to more sustainability can be prepared and 
supported from the bottom up – but they will only reach the whole society if they can 
also be politically enforced.  
Binding sustainability targets 
The findings above imply that it is unavoidable to introduce a form of “obligatory 
sustainability” including regulated sufficiency. This is particularly the case in product 
areas in which the collective effects of unsustainable production and consumption 
detract from the quality of life for a majority of people, including rapid land 
consumption and the unnecessary waste of energy in buildings, vehicles, and 
appliances. Further directives and regulations will have to set the frame in which free 
consumption and production decisions can be made. The issue is about limits for horse 
power and vehicle weight, about the consumption of household appliances, fertilizers, 
pesticides, antibiotics, residential and commercial areas, roads and runways and so on. 
Requirements are needed to guide the Energiewende, if the targeted (absolute) 
decoupling of economic growth from energy consumption is to be achieved. 
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Furthermore, general requirements have the advantage of being fair. A speed limit, for 
example, is an obligation for behaviour of solidarity. It applies to all without 
exemptions. If on the other hand fuel prices would increase further – no matter whether 
due to scarcity or additional taxes – poor people would no longer be able to drive as 
much, while the wealthy would not be equally affected. Another measure with equal 
impact on all is stopping the expansion of the road network.   
This approach has already been partly implemented in Germany and the EU. Until 
end of 2011, for example, the topmost floor or the ceiling above it had to be (re-) 
equipped with thermal insulation. The EU Eco-Design Directive stipulates that, as of 
2012, only fridges with the energy label A+ or better can be sold. The same directive 
states that the stand-by consumption of electric appliances is now limited to half a Watt 
and the maximum power of a vacuum cleaner to 900 Watt. Consumers are supported 
in their deciding between cheap products with high life-time costs and more 
economical ones. Sufficiency-promoting consumption decisions are encouraged and 
wasteful behaviour discouraged. This includes the removal of asocial privileges.  
Technological innovation and modest economic activity and lifestyle are 
complementary. Only the effective mix of education, information, financial incentives, 
steering with taxes, but also directives and bans can lead to the required economic and 
social processes of change. 
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6. Governing the Energiewende?  
A Joint Task 
 It is a sustained delusion of energy policy that efficiency improvements can be 
realized by the market and sovereign consumers alone. 
 Significant barriers and market failures imply that there is unfair competition 
between energy supply (megawatts) and savings through efficiency technologies 
(“negawatts”). 
 The dynamic development of the Energiewende has so far been enabled by 
activities of decentralized actors such as municipalities, regional networks, 
energy cooperatives 
6.1. Energy efficiency pays for itself – or does it?  
In principle, energy savings and energy efficiency are the quickest, most comprehensive 
and most economical way to mitigate climate change and save resources. In order to 
actually implement the “efficiency revolution” and shift to more sufficient 
consumption of energy services, several methodological and institutional challenges 
have to be tackled by energy policy. It requires courageous, forward-looking and 
innovative politicians – a precondition that is not always fulfilled in reality. In contrast, 
there is still the tendency to prove the vast energy-saving potential in scenarios, but to 
treat even official energy-saving targets rather as symbolic policy, as a placebo for the 
worried public.  
The placebo of energy policy 
So what exactly is an energy-political placebo? It describes a situation in which both 
international and national scenarios demonstrate that about 50% of the required 
climate-change mitigation can (and must) be achieved by increased energy efficiency, 
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but no far-reaching measures for implementation are taken. Scenarios promise a cure 
but the virus of exceedingly high energy consumption is still spreading.  
This is the basis for symbolic policy. Whoever openly rejects the promise of energy-
efficiency potentials is fighting a lost battle. On the other, whoever wants to implement 
relevant and target-group-specific policy measures that go beyond appeals to consumer 
responsibility and information campaigns is also fighting a losing battle.  
It is a sustained delusion of energy policy that efficiency improvements – as everybody 
wants them – can be realized by the market and sovereign consumers alone. The market 
for energy services requires regulation and interventions to that it can function. On a 
free market the perspective of suppliers does not coincide with the perspective of 
consumers. As long as you make your money from the sales of energy there is no interest 
in increased efficiency on the demand side. Only if the framework conditions are 
adapted in a way that the supply of energy services results both in a cost digression for 
the consumer and appropriate profits for the supplier, will there be a market for energy 
efficiency. This type of incentive-regulation is practised in several countries but not yet 
in Germany. 
The latest National Energy Efficiency Action Plan from 2014 still builds heavily on 
voluntary measures and information, and includes very few new interventions that 
strengthen economic incentives for energy efficiency and tighten the regulatory frame. 
According to the German NGO Deutsche Umwelthilfe, the Action Plan will only 
achieve one third of the 7% energy savings that are the official government target 
(DUH, 2014). The reservations of German politicians to actively govern energy 
efficiency are difficult to grasp – not only because more energy efficiency is a 
precondition for the success of the Energiewende, but also because of the large 
macroeconomic benefits of deploying energy efficient technology (see section 4.3).  
Taking energy-efficiency potentials and barriers to implementation 
seriously 
Energy-saving policy can be successful if two strategies are followed. Firstly, the misuse 
of merely symbolic policy should be avoided. Secondly, evidence should be provided 
that even highly economical energy-efficiency technologies and solutions are not 
implemented due to a number of barriers. 
The starting point of the debate is that national and global energy systems are extremely 
inefficient energy transformation machines. From 100% primary energy supply, only 
about a third goes into the use of energy services. The rest is lost on the way from 
primary energy to useful energy and further to the respective energy service. Some 
energy services stick out in their efficiency of utilizing final energy. Passive houses use 
less than 15 kWh/m2 for heating, which is only 10% of the average heating demand in 
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the German building stock. LED light bulbs with the same lighting performance as 
60W incandescent bulbs require only about 10W.  
If the inefficient energy transformation machine replaces fossil fuels with renewable 
energy, it is still – figuratively speaking – a bathtub that is filled without a stopper. 
Hence, the “first law” of the Energiewende should read: Avoid losses first and then cover 
the remaining energy demand as quickly and comprehensively as possible with renewable 
energy.  
Within ten years GHG emissions can be reduced by more than 20% in addition to the 
ongoing trend of endogenous efficiency improvements, creating a dividend for 
companies, consumers and the whole economy. By 2050 energy consumption in the 
EU can be reduced by 57% against the current trend, including energy-cost savings of 
EUR 500 billion per year. In this scenario primary energy supply and GHG emissions 
are even decreased by two thirds through reductions in final energy consumption and 
savings in the power generation system (Bossmann, Eichhammer, & Elsland, 2012). 
The efficient use of electricity in the three sectors – industry, households as well as small 
business, trade and services – accounts for a third of the total economic potential for 
reducing GHG emissions by improving energy efficiency (see Figure 11). The most 
economical reductions can be achieved in the areas of ventilation, air conditioning, 
ICT, compressed air, pumps, lighting and refrigeration. Furthermore, energy efficiency 
in production (mainly process heat) and in buildings (mainly floor heating) can each 
provide a third of the reductions. 
 
Figure 11:  
Theoretical cost-potential curve of GHG emissions reduction through energy savings (based on Berlo et al., 2011) 
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1. ventilation and air conditioning
2. ICT, TV, stand-by
3. compressed air
4. efficient pumps
5. commercial and industrial lighting
6. commercial and industrial cooling
7. CFL and LED lighting in households
8. refrigerators and freezers (households)
9. process heat savings
10. thermal insulation (renovation)
11. substitution of electric night-storage heating 
12. hydraulic optimization
13. condensing gas boilers (replacing conventional oil)
14. condensing gas boilers (replacing conventional gas)
15. substitution of electric process heat
16. thermal insulation (new build)
17. condensing oil boilers (replacing conventional oil)
18. tumble-dryers
19. heat exchangers
20. substitution of electric water heating
21. heat pumps
22. washing machines and dish washers
23. gas cooking instead of electric
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The figure illustrates the economic potential assuming the ideal of a level playing field, 
on which efficiency technology and energy supply are interchangeable and, thus, freely 
compete with each other. A certain energy service (e.g. space heating, force, lighting, 
communication) can be supplied with low energy input at maximum efficiency and 
vice versa. For the economy and consumers alike it is important that energy services are 
provided at minimum cost (including external costs). The costs of efficiency 
technologies and energy supply are calculated in the same way, which means that the 
respective technical life-span is taken into consideration and the same interest rate is 
used. 
Actual energy markets are fundamentally different from this level playing field.  
Significant barriers and market failures imply that there is no free competition between 
energy supply (megawatts) and energy savings through efficiency technologies 
(“negawatts”). The multitude of barriers is the main reason that an account of 
economical potentials for energy efficiency exists at all. They keep the market from 
tapping into the potentials. Some of the most significant barriers are listed below: 
 Continuous subsidies to energy supply as external costs are not sufficiently 
internalized 
 Little consideration of life-cycle costs/much attention to investment costs (e.g. 
of building plans or refrigerators)  
 Extremely short payback periods (mainly) in industry (two to three years) 
 High transaction and search costs due to an enormous variety of products and 
suppliers 
 Principal agent dilemma (e.g. split incentives in all rental buildings) 
These and further technology, target-group and sector-specific barriers are widely 
recognized. If they are not removed systematically by an active efficiency policy, the 
enormous flow of capital into the inefficient expansion of energy supply will continue 
further. This would be an unnecessary burden on the environment and drive up overall 
costs for the provision of energy services. 
The current instrument mix of German energy-efficiency policy is indeed partially 
targeted at removing some particular barriers. The policy still has large holes in respect 
of power-saving appliances and equipment, non-residential buildings, industry and 
transport. Even the German government admits that the current mix is not enough to 
achieve the annual energy savings of 1.5%, which are required by the EU Energy 
Efficiency Directive. This is despite the fact that the EU target is even lower than 
Germany’s own Energiewende target. What is required to tap into the efficiency 
potentials and reach the targets? 
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Overcoming barriers with ambitious, targeted policy instruments 
In order to remove the multitude of barriers, a well-designed mix of policy instruments 
is needed, including: 
 Efficiency directives that protect consumers from wasteful buildings, 
appliances and equipment. Two examples are the EU Eco-Design Directive 
and the German Energy Savings Ordinance (for buildings). 
 Support programmes that give incentives to switch to more efficient 
alternatives. An example is the programme of the German development bank 
KfW to support the energy-efficient construction and refurbishment of 
residential buildings. 
 Energy consulting and information requirements. Examples are energy 
performance certificates for buildings, energy labels on appliances, but also 
professional education and on-the-job training for planners, craftspeople and 
sales people.  
A combination of more and better regulation with a public fund for energy savings has 
the potential to close some of the holes in the current policy mix and finance the 
necessary support programmes (see Figure 12). The suggested national energy savings 
fund should be seen as a central independent institution for the coordination of energy 
efficiency. It can be financed from revenues of auctioning CO2 emission allowances, 
from a surcharge on the price of final energy, or alternatively an adaptation of energy 
taxes and the phase-out of environmentally harmful subsidies.  
 
Figure 12:  
Possible combination of regulation and a public energy fund to implement Art.7 of the EU Energy Efficiency Directive 
(based on Pehnt & Brischke, 2013) 
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6.2.  Polycentric governance structures emerge and 
should be strengthened 
The Energiewende is a complex process that cannot be designed and implemented by 
the national government in Berlin alone. There is a great opportunity in strengthening 
the role of German states, regions and municipalities in the Energiewende process and 
giving them the autonomy to act independently. In a multilevel political system the 
lower levels often have a catalyzing and pioneering function. In many areas of Germany 
they have already become the drivers of a highly dynamic development. The success of 
the “federal Energiewende” depends on a strong collaborative effort, which is 
characterized by “polycentric governance”. 
Polycentric governance is understood as being the delegation of responsibility to many 
centres of decision-making that formally are independent of each other but in practice 
often interrelated. The concept was coined by economist and Nobel laureate Elinor 
Ostrom. One of her key ideas was that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a single 
governance model that can deal with the multitude of specific local challenges. 
Principles for the efficient design of local institutions are more successful if they are 
based on polycentric governance theory. Delegating decisions to the local level helps to 
engage citizens and authorities more in governing important social and environmental 
challenges. In other words, self-organization is key, even although it does not appear in 
standard economic theory. Ten years of experience with the Energiewende show that 
many projects that are implemented on the ground go far beyond what is supported by 
the state and “rational” on the market.  
Polycentric governance acknowledges the creative and constructive potential of NGOs, 
voluntary work initiatives and other non-market organizations. It supports their work 
as a necessary and conducive part of the overall Energiewende process. 
There are numerous examples of the importance of polycentric dynamics in the area of 
energy. Regional energy networks, bio-energy villages, 100% renewable municipalities, 
newly founded energy cooperatives, citizens’ financing of renewable power plants and 
the like all illustrate that spatially limited development can act as transformative nucleus 
and push forward the ideas of the Energiewende. 
Polycentric governance still means that the federal government retains responsibility 
for the Energiewende process, including ambitious target-setting,  suitable framework 
conditions, and the balancing of conflicting interests regarding energy policy (between 
industry, civil society, academia, between federal states and municipalities).  
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Re-socialization: prosumers, energy cooperatives, 100% renewable 
municipalities, regional networks 
The formation of the first “transformative nuclei” started in Germany as far back as 40 
years ago. Throughout the whole country local and regional groups were founded in 
the vicinity of planned NPPs. Very early on, these groups discussed alternatives to an 
energy supply system that is based mainly on coal, nuclear power and oil.  
Alongside this social development, the technology for decentral power generation was 
also further developed. Substantial improvements were achieved in respect of wind 
power, photovoltaics and biogas, but also small-scale CHP and energy savings in 
applications. Increasing production of these systems triggered economies of scale and 
improved their economic performance. Starting in the early 90s the first feed-in law 
and later the EEG were the major drivers of this process. The laws were enacted against 
massive resistance by the well-organized energy industry in Germany. The share of 
power from renewable sources in overall electricity generation increased from 7% in 
2000 to about 30% today (AG Energiebilanzen, 2015).  
 
Figure 13:  
Diversity of actors in the ownership of renewable power generation capacity 2012 (source: Renewable Energies 
Agency 2012)  
This dynamic development was not driven by large energy corporations but by a wide 
variety of actors (see Figure 13). Many small-scale investors were irritated by the global 
financial crisis of 2008/09 and stock market crashes and started looking for new 
investment opportunities, which they found in renewable energy projects or other 
ethical investments. Privately owned wind farms and solar parks became sought-after 
investments and more and more citizens grouped in energy cooperatives to finance and 
implement power plants running on renewable energy. 
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The nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima in 2011 gave additional momentum to such 
projects and initiatives. Within two years, more than 130 rural districts, municipalities, 
regional networks and cities grouped together to meet their energy demands to 100% 
with renewable sources. The number of energy cooperatives has increased to nearly  
1 000 as of today (Müller & Holstenkamp, 2015). 
The term “prosumer” is characteristic of this social trend towards re-socialization of 
energy production and use based on modern technology. Prosumers are today’s modern 
energy users who produce the electricity they consume themselves, e.g. with a rooftop 
PV system, a small-scale CHP or a share in a wind farm.  
CO2 free cities are more liveable cities 
There are 13 cities in Germany with more than half a million inhabitants and about 80 
cities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants. Together with several 
hundred cities with between 20 000 and 100 000 inhabitants they are the centres for 
development and application of the transformation challenge posed by the 
Energiewende. The physical manifestation of the Energiewende occurs in 
municipalities. Thus, municipalities should engage pro-actively in local 
implementation and with as much power as possible. The national government and the 
states have the task of demanding this engagement and supporting it. 
Germany’s urban areas are where a majority of Germans work, live and spend their 
leisure time. These are all functions of liveable cities for which people consume various 
energy and mobility services. In order to provide these services in a positive, smoothly 
running, sustainable and climate-friendly way, deep structural change is required. Cities 
only have few decades to go through this challenging transformation process, which 
entails the decarbonization of virtually all activities in cities. The principle to follow is 
similar to the strategy for the whole Energiewende: Tap into the energy-saving 
potentials in respect of electricity and space heating first, and cover the remaining 
energy demand in the least environmentally harmful way.  
Liveable cities will have to abolish today’s dominating separation of areas for living, 
working and leisure. This is a major strategy to avoid congestion due to large streams 
of commuters, transport related energy consumption, as well as CO2 emissions and not 
least air pollution. If city planning is oriented towards sustainable lifestyles, cities will 
become more liveable, as dwellings and workplaces are redesigned, additional parks and 
green areas are created and the amount of air pollution and noise emissions can be 
reduced. 
As the potential to utilize renewable energy sources in cities is limited, they should start 
cooperation with the urban hinterland. This kind of urban-rural link is particularly 
beneficial in respect of the utilization of bio energy and wind power. Utility companies 
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or municipalities themselves can take shares in wind parks or bio gas plants, which will 
be built in surrounding rural areas with the respective potentials. Moreover, there might 
be the potential to produce wood pellets which can be used as a heat source for small 
district heating grids or large municipal buildings such as schools or administrations. 
Someday the “Kurort” (spa town) sign as you enter cities might be retrofitted or 
replaced with a label “CO2 neutral”.  
Re-municipalization: creating added value for citizens instead of 
privatizing profits 
The majority of about 14 000 concessions in the electricity sector have expired in the 
last five years. Until the end of 2010 there were about 200 municipal acquisitions of 
transmission grids and more than 70 new foundations of municipal utility companies. 
Most newly founded utilities strive to become active along the whole value chain, 
including eco-efficient services (see Figure 14). The rapid development of decentral 
power generation technology based on renewable energy sources has created the 
opportunity to organize power supply in small decentral units, guarantee a high degree 
of security of supplies, and at the same time achieve further targets such as climate 
change mitigation, economic sustainability and social responsibility (Berlo & Wagner, 
2013a, 2013b).  
 
Figure 14:  
By expanding their value chains, municipal utility companies improve their economic standing (Berlo & Wagner, 
2013b) 
Another argument for the re-municipalization of local energy supplies is the electricity 
price hike in recent years, which has triggered an increasing demand for customer and 
sector-specific energy-saving services. This an interesting field for utility companies that 
have – due to their well-developed local ties and local knowledge – a competitive 
advantage. Moreover, highly developed ICT offers new ways of bi-directional steering 
and regulation of power generation, distribution and consumption, which further 
supports the trend towards decentralization and re-municipalization.  
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Disentanglement of power: interplay of social and technological 
innovation 
The development of photovoltaic technology departed from a niche application in 
space research and is now a commodity that can be used by everybody. The Renewable 
Energy Sources Act triggered demand which in turn enabled substantial investment 
into product and process innovation. As a result, the power generation costs of 
photovoltaics fell below the purchase price, the so-called “grid parity”. As of today, 
more than one million photovoltaic systems not only generate about 7% of the German 
electricity demand but also contribute to the restructuring of the overall energy system. 
Power no longer comes exclusively from large thermal power plants owned by 
oligopolists, but also from the roof of one’s own house, of the school, of the apartment 
block, of the farmer’s shed etc.  
When the sun does not shine or the wind does not blow the power grids are still needed 
to secure supplies. Hence, existing regulation needs to be further developed so that 
decentral users of the power grids participate adequately in the costs of the grids and 
security of supply.  
The technological revolution in renewable energy technology, which besides 
photovoltaics also includes wind power and bio gas, was not without opposition. The 
transformation towards a climate-responsible society is a challenge that does not only 
require a shift in technology but also major overthrows in power structures and decision 
making structures. It is easy to understand that those who lose power and economic 
influence during the change process oppose the transformation. In return it is crucial 
to win a broad majority for the Energiewende and to achieve the integration of various 
involved actors, in order to accomplish a climate-neutral society in a democratic 
country. 
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7.The German Energiewende in 
   an international context  
 The trend of global energy economy indicators remains alarming for most 
world regions. 
 The steep cost-digression of renewable-energy technology, a favourable 
investment climate and numerous co-benefits of transforming energy systems 
are strong drivers of a global Energiewende. 
 Despite the specific setting of the Energiewende in Germany, there are some 
lessons to be learnt from it, including the importance of a sound science base 
and ambitious quantitative targets, the key role of energy savings, the potential 
for large macroeconomic benefits, and not least the crucial role of a decentral 
bottom-up movement.  
The Energiewende in Germany is still in its infancy. The dynamic development that 
has taken place in the power generation sector needs to be maintained and spread to 
the other important areas of heat, transport and, not least, efficiency. The 
Energiewende has to accelerate to meet its ambitious target.  
While many countries in Europe and beyond have started to act on climate-change 
mitigation and on transitioning their energy systems, overall global trends remain 
alarming. Driven by income growth (and to a lesser extent population growth) global 
CO2 emissions continue to rise even further, and other key drivers of emissions, namely 
the energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy mix, have 
worsened in several regions of the world (Mundaca T., Markandya, & Nørgaard, 
2013). 
Despite these trends, there are various factors that favour a global Energiewende, 
including the price-drop in low-carbon technology, the favourable conditions for 
financing investments into these technologies, and not least the enormous co-benefits 
besides climate-change mitigation. These factors, together with the ever more visible 
impacts of climate change, have started to change the perception that mitigation is a 
burden. The shift from burden-sharing to benefit-sharing is crucial for the prospects of 
an effective global climate regime. While a comprehensive Energiewende does entail 
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drastic changes to the energy-economy, it is the only way to go, a way that is beneficial 
not least from an economic perspective.  
6.3. Steep cost digression in the cost of low-carbon 
technology 
In power generation, global capacity additions of clean energy technology overtook 
those of conventional sources for the first time in 2013, and further dynamic 
development is forecasted. This means that the transformation of the power system is 
taking place not only in Germany, but in many world regions. Countries like Germany 
or Denmark already face some of the challenges related to the transition, and these will 
have to be tackled by many other countries in the medium-term. 
 
Figure 15:  
Power generation capacity additions and forecast 2015-2030 (source: Bloomberg NEF) 
The largest driver of the rapid increase in capacity additions is the steep (and to some 
extent unexpected) cost digression of renewable-energy technology. In Germany the 
feed-in tariff for power from photovoltaics dropped about 80% from 43 ct/kWh in 
2005 to 8.7 ct/kWh in 2015. The cost of photovoltaic power generation is expected to 
decrease further to 4-6 ct/kWh in Europe in 2025, reaching 2-4 ct/kWh in 2050 
(Fraunhofer ISE & Agora Energiewende, 2015). Similar but less drastic developments 
could be observed for the cost of wind power. In particular on-shore wind power in 
good locations is already cost-competitive with conventional power plants. The 
competitiveness of renewable energy will further improve when national and 
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international carbon-pricing regimes are tightened and start to send significant price 
signals. Furthermore, it is important to remember that there are many low-cost energy-
efficiency options, which are even cheaper than generating power – be it from 
renewable energy sources or fossil fuels (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16:  
Levelized cost ranges of electricity generation and achieved energy savings in the US (Molina, 2014) 
6.4. Favourable conditions for investment in the 
Energiewende 
Global investment in renewable energy and energy-efficiency technology have risen 
enormously over the last decade and due to falling technology costs these investments 
lead to more and more renewable energy and energy savings on a per-unit basis. 
Currently there are at least three large drivers that favour further investment into the 
transition of energy systems around the world.  
Firstly, oil and gas prices are very low. This means the incentives to invest in new and 
more risky exploration projects are also low. At the same time, low-carbon technology 
investment becomes less and less risky from an economic perspective. 
Secondly, financial markets are in an prolonged period of low interest rates. This makes 
it comparably more attractive to invest in real capital such as renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and the infrastructure involved, rather than in financial products. 
Thirdly, in many countries investment rates are low and increased investment in low-
carbon technology and infrastructure has the potential to improve growth prospects, in 
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this case green growth. Early movers in specific renewable-energy technology, energy 
efficiency, sustainable mobility and so forth have the opportunity to take larger shares 
of growing markets of the future.  
6.5. The co-benefits of a global Energiewende 
Without co-benefits neither the German nor any Energiewende can be successful (see 
section 4.7). For various contexts it is even debatable whether decarbonization is the 
main benefit. It is, however, the most salient and overarching social challenge, so it is 
fair to focus the discussion on it.  
International co-benefits from climate change mitigation have recently been studied by 
various actors and from many different perspectives. The Global Commission on the 
Energy and Climate (GCEC) has tweaked the well-known marginal abatement cost 
curve (see for example Figure 11) in their report “Better Growth Better Climate: The 
New Climate Economy Report” and presented a marginal abatement benefits curve 
instead (New Climate Economy, 2014). This curve includes the monetarized benefits 
from less local air pollution, rural development benefits related to land use and forestry, 
benefits from reduced fossil fuel price volatility and benefits from a modal shift in 
transport.  
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) took another approach in their study on 
global energy subsidies (Coady, Parry, Sears, & Shang, 2015). In their definition of 
subsidies the non-internalization of external costs was included. In other words, if 
carbon-energy taxes do not reflect true social costs (including the cost of climate change, 
air pollution and other environmental damage), the difference between the tax level 
and the true costs is considered a subsidy. With this definition the IMF came to the 
impressive finding that a phase-out of all subsidies would result in additional 
government revenues of USD 2.9 trillion in 2015.  
While bundling and monetizing co-benefits of climate-change mitigation is a tricky 
exercise that rests on many simplifications and assumptions, which is acknowledged 
both by the GCEC and the IMF, there is also the option to look at impacts one by one 
without translating everything into the language of money. In recent research on the 
impacts of the carbon reduction pledges that countries submitted in advance of the 
climate conference COP21 in Paris this year, the potential for co-benefits in the EU, 
the US and China was mapped. The results illustrate impressively that the co-benefits 
of decarbonization are not only about money (e.g. savings from reduced fossil fuel 
imports), but also about providing hundreds of thousands of jobs in an meaningful 
sector as well as preventing hundreds of thousands of premature deaths (see Table 3). 
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Table 3:  
Selected co-benefits of a 100% renewable energy trajectory, compatible with the 2 degrees target, as compared to the 
current policies trajectory (source: Höhne et al., 2015) 
Co-benefit EU US China Total 
Cost savings from reduced fossil 
fuel imports (billion per year) 
USD 170 USD 160 USD 190 USD 520 
Premature deaths from excessive 
ambient exposure to fine 
particulate matter prevented 
46 000  27 000  1 200 000  1 300 000  
Creation of additional green jobs 
in wind, solar and hydro energy 
430 000  650 000  1 900 000 3 000 000 
6.6. Knowledge gained from the German Energiewende 
“What can we learn from them [Germany]? We can’t transplant their desire to reject nuclear 
power. We can’t appropriate their experience of two great nation-changing projects—
rebuilding their country when it seemed impossible, 70 years ago, and reunifying their 
country when it seemed forever divided, 25 years ago. But we can be inspired to think that 
the Energiewende might be possible for other countries too.” (Kunzig, 2015) 
The German Energiewende cannot be and should not be the blueprint for energy 
transition in other countries. Firstly, the Energiewende is not yet advanced enough to 
serve as a reliable role model. Secondly, the socio-economic, political and geographic 
conditions are different from country to country. Thirdly, the ambition should not be 
to copy Germany, but to avoid its mistakes and perform better.  
Despite these disclaimers, there are certainly many specific insights from the 
Energiewende that can inform and inspire engagement in energy transition elsewhere: 
 Sound science about the necessity and technical feasibility of the Energiewende 
helped to form both political and social consensus about its desirability.  
 An explicit and ambitious target system serves as the reference base for the 
evaluation of progress and the continuous adjustment of policy interventions. 
 Despite the doubtless need for electrification of the energy system, the heat 
and transport sectors are crucial areas for comprehensive energy transition, 
which is often forgotten in the German case. 
 The Energiewende is simply not feasible without realizing substantial energy 
savings, for which there are three main drivers, namely energy-efficient 
technology, structural change of the economy, and sufficiency in the 
consumption of energy services. 
 The Energiewende is beneficial from a macroeconomic perspective. Current 
expenses are easily outweighed by future returns, and the co-benefits today are 
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in many cases also the main driving force behind the engagement in the 
Energiewende. 
 The successful management of the Energiewende depends on many actors at 
various levels and cannot be mastered by national politicians alone. Actions 
taken by citizens, municipalities, regions, various types of networks, 
cooperatives and clusters are key for the actual implementation of grand plans.  
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